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Entrepreneurship in a Later Industrialising Economy: the case of Bernardo 
Mascarenhas and the Textile Industry in Minas Gerais, Brazil 1 
Domingos Giroletti, Federal University of Minas Gerais and Visiting Fellow, 
Business History Unit, London School of Economics 
Introduction 
The modernization of Brazil began in the second half of the last century. Many factors 
contributed to this development: the transfer of the Portuguese Court to Rio de 
Janeiro and the opening of ports to trade with all friendly countries in 1808; 
Independence in 1822; the development of coffee production; tariff reform in 1845; 
and the suppression of the trans-Atlantic slave trade around 1850, which freed capital 
for investments in other activities. Directly and indirectly these factors promoted 
industrial expansion which began with the introduction of modern textile mills. Many 
factories were organized, from Maranhao in the north to Rio Grande do Sui in the 
south. The greatest concentration of these factories was in the prices of Rio de 
Janeiro, Sao Paulo, Bahia and Minas Gerais.2 Most were owned by small companies, 
employed less than one hundred workers and produced for local markets. A few 
larger factories , with more than three hundred employees were located mainly in Rio 
de Janeiro and Sao Paulo. The Rio mills produced for wider markets and used a 
commercial network to sell imported industrial fabrics. 3 The most dynamic economy 
1I would like to thank Francis Goodall , Nick Tiratsoo, Terry Gourvish and Colin 
Lewis for their useful suggestions . This project was fmanced by a CNPQ grant. 
2 More details about Brazilian economic development are contained in C. Furtado 
The Economic Growth of Brazil: a Survey from Colonial to Modem Times (Berkeley , 
1963) and W. Suzigan IndUstria Brasileira: Origem e Desenvolvimento (Sao Paulo, 
1986) . For a survey of the literature, see C M Lewis "Brazilian Business History , 
1850-1945: recent trends in the literature" (unpublished paper, LSE, 1993) . 
3For a general view of the Brazilian textile mills, see, SI Stein The Brazilian 
Cotton Manufacture: Textile Enterprise in an Underdeveloped Area, 1850-1950 
(Cambridge, Mass . , 1957) . 
was Slio Paulo, which was based on coffee production and exports and used free 
labour, mainly Italian immigrants . The coffee trade made possible railway construction 
and fostered urbanization and industrialization. These changes , and the export-import 
trade, increased the internal market for Brazilian cloth. Most skilled workers in the 
Rio and Slio Paulo mills were European immigrants . Many of the industrial 
entrepreneurs and managers came originally from the export-import trade and they, 
too, were usually immigrants or foreign traders . The literature usually states that 
skilled workers and entrepreneurs were already trained when they arrived from 
abroad .' 
This paper will focus on Minas Gerais . The region was originally settled when gold 
and diamond mines were established there during the eighteenth century. Gold and 
diamonds became important items in the international trade markets of colonial Brazil 
and the trade promoted exchanges amongst previously isolated regional economies. 
During the golden age (1700-1770) many towns were founded in central Minas Gerais . 
These towns became a focus for commercial activities and production as well as 
important mining areas . The exhaustion of individual mines did not mean the 
abandonment of precious mineral production: some slave owners continued to work 
in extraction. Such production kept the internal market ticking over . However, 
many left the gold areas with their families and slaves and settled previously 
unexplored forest land in the south, west and northeast. They organized plantations 
to produce coffee for export via Rio de Janeiro. Until their coffee established a 
'There are several contributions about the Slio Paulo industrial and urban 
development: W. Dean The Industrialization of saG Paulo, 1880-1945 (Austin, 1969); 
W Suzigan, op. cit; W Cano Raizes da Concentrafao Industrial em saG Paulo (Slio 
Paulo, (1977) . 
SThere is a very important literature about gold development and settlement. See 
C R Boxer The Golden Age of Brazil, 1694 - 1750: Growing Pains of a Colonial 
Society (Berkeley, 1962); A B Castro 7 Ensaios sob re a Economia Brasileira (Rio, 
1971); P Singer Desenvolvimento Econ6mico e Evolufao Urbana (Slio Paulo, 1968). 
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reputation in external markets many minerio farmers manufactured goods to be sold 
in the growing city of Rio de Janeiro. 6 
Most factories in Minas Gerais were situated in the coffee area . Juiz de Fora, known 
as the Brazilian Manchester, became an internal centre of distribution after the Uniao 
e Industria turnpike was built to transport coffee to Rio de Janeiro. Coffee 
production, trade and transport were the main factors that explained the great 
concentration of capital in Juiz de Fora. Before beginning construction of the road, the 
Uniao and Industria Company brought German skilled craftsmen to Juiz de Fora for 
the project. They came to prepare the materials to be used in road-building. When 
work for the Company fmished , most of these craftsmen stayed in town and opened 
their own workshops to produce industrial goods for the internal market. Many other 
factories, textile mills, shops and services were organized there during the last 
century. In these businesses , European skil led workers occupied the leading positions, 
just as they did in Sao Paulo industries. In Juiz de Fora there were two kinds of 
industrial entrepreneur: local capitalists came from agricultural , service and trading 
backgrounds; other manufacturers were irrunigrants, especially Germans and 
Ital ians7. 
From this brief description, it can be seen that there are more differences than 
similarities in the industrialization processes of Sao Paulo and Juiz de Fora. European 
skilled workers were to be found in both areas and coffee production created the 
general conditions for growth, including capital , markets , infrastructure, transport, and 
6'fo get more information about the development of coffee production, see S Silva 
Expansao Cafeeira e Origens da Industria no Brasil (Sao Paulo , 1976) ; J D Wirth 
Minas Gerais in the Brazilian Federation, 1889-1937 (Stanford , 1977); 0 Valverde 
"Estudo Regional da Zona da Mata de Minas Gerais " Revista Brasileira de Geografta , 
Rio de Janeiro,20(l)3-82, 1958. 
7D Giroletti A Companhia ea Rodovia Uniao e Industria e 0 Desenvolvimento de 
Juiz de Fora, 1850 a 1900 (Belo Horizonte DCP/UFMG, 1980, unpublished paper) . 
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so forth; but there were differences . In Minas Gerais, coffee production and most 
agricultural activities were carried out almost exclusively by slaves and the internal 
market was more limited. In Sao Paulo, on the contrary , coffee was increasingly 
cultivated by free workers . After the opening of the Santos Jundiai Railway in 1867 
and the subsequent construction of a locally-fmanced provincial railway network in the 
1870s, Sao Paulo became the most important city in Brazil and the greatest industrial, 
service, trade and fmancial centre.8 After the opening of the Uniao and Industria 
Road, Juiz de Fora grew as an industrial and trading centre but only to a very limited 
extent. The social origin of the industrial entrepreneurs in the two locations was also 
different. The paulista capitalist usually came from import and export trading and 
most were immigrants. In Juiz de Fora, however, entrepreneurs did not come from 
a background in international trade and only half were immigrants, so their foreign 
commercial linkages were very weak. As already indicated, most domestic mineiro 
industrialists had previously been active in agriculture, services or internal trading .9 
Even within Minas Gerais , there were many differences amongst the SUb-regions . The 
nineteenth century Minas Gerais economy was described as a mosaic, meaning that 
linkages between regions were weak. Perhaps this explains why the development of 
the textile mills in the centre and north on Minas Gerais was not directly related to 
coffee production. As a result these factories did not use European immigrants as 
workers . Instead they relied on native Brazilians - free whites, slaves and ex-slaves -
and on former peasants or crafstrnen. Most of the textile workers were children and 
women (around 70 %). With no previous experience to draw on, the textile 
entrepreneurs had to develop a process to transform these unskilled workers into a 
skilled industrial workforce. A special strategy was developed, beginning at the mill 
8C.M Lewis Public Policy and Priwue Initiative: Railway Building in Sao Paulo, 
1860-1889 (London, 1991); F.A.M. de Saes A Grande Empresa de Servicos Publicos 
na Economia Cafeeira, 1850-1930 (Sao Paulo, 1986). 
9'fhis process was analysed by D Giroletti Industrializa(:iio de Juiz de Fora, 1850-
1930 (Juiz de Fora, 1988). 
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and continuing in the industrial village . The textile mills were organized around 
British machinery, using skilled English workers to supervise production and to train 
Brazilian workers lO • 
Looking at entrepreneurial and managerial formation in textiles during the last three 
decades of the nineteenth century, it should be said to begin with that Brazil was a 
slave society until 1888 with little industrial tradition. What did textile entrepreneurs 
do to become successful and what had they done to modernize in technological and 
industrial terms? This question may be addressed by examining the family and 
educational background of the minerio entrepreneuriate, taking as an example the 
career of Bemardo Mascarenhas . Mascarenhas established one of the earliest textile 
mills in Minas Gerais, the Cedro Mill (CEM), which was set up in 1869. Gradually 
the firm expanded and it is today the biggest textile group in Minas Gerais and one 
of the largest in Brazil ll. 
Family and educational background 
The main textile entrepreneurial group in Minas Gerais came from one large family. 
Antonio and Policena Mascarenhas had thirteen sons and daughters . Antonio was the 
son of a Portuguese muleteer, married to a native woman. His parents were killed 
when he was a child. Antonio was adopted by a farmer and he grew up and learned 
to read and write. When he was 12 years old he went to live with his godfather and 
there he learned metalwork with an Italian immigrant. When he reached adulthood he 
IOFor more details about that strategy, see D Giroletti Fdbrica Convento 
Disciplina (Belo Horizonte, 1991). 
IIFor more information, see A M Vaz A Industria Textil em Minas Gerais, 0 
Papel da Familia Mascarenhas: 1872 a 1892 (Belo Horizonte, 1976); G M 
Mascarenhas Centendrio da Fdbrica do Cedro, Historico, 1872-1972 (Belo Horizonte , 
1972); D Giroletti Modemiza(:iio Capitalista em Minas - a Forma(:iio do Operariado 
Industrial e de uma Nova Cosmovisiio (Rio de Janeiro, Museu Nacional , 1987, PhD 
Thesis). 
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was invited to manage his godfather' s farm. He was able to save some money as a 
manager and metalworker and later was married to a farmer's daughter. With his 
savings, he moved from the west to the central area, Paraopeba, en route to 
Diamantina, a gold and diamond town in the north of Minas Gerais , organizing a 
grocery store there in 1832. 
As a trader, Antonio made a lot of money which he invested in several farms and 
many slaves . One of these enterprises , Sao Sebastiao, was a very big plantation with 
one hundred and fifty slaves , producing coffee, cotton, sugar, beans, maize, rice, 
handmade cotton fabric, salt pork, muLes and cattle for the internal and external 
market. ost of the Mascarenhas farms had their own craft workshops including a 
watermill, brickworks , cane crushers , sawmill and abattoir; and many skilled slave 
workers including carpenters, joiners, blacksmiths, metalworkers, shoemakers and 
dressmakers. The craft slaves usually attended to the farm's needs but sometimes they 
were let to outside farmers or attended to external orders . In 1883, Antonio organized 
the Slio Sebastiao textile mill using the farm 's slaves as industrial workers . 
All thirteen of Mascarenhas 's sons and daughters received a very strong catholic 
upbringing . They learned to work from childhood onwards . The work had a moral 
value, but was also seen as the best way to personal fulfllment and economic 
independence, folJowing the example of their father, Antonio. These strong moral and 
work values, evident in the letters of many sons, were very important to stimulate 
their descendants to progress in the business .12 
All the sons and daughters were sent to catholic boarding schools . These secondary 
schools were the best in Minas Gerais . There, the boys had a general education in 
12For more details about Mascarenhas Family, see P Tarnm A Fam{lia 
Mascarenhas e a Industria Th:til de Juiz de Fora em Minas Gerais (8elo Horizonte, 
L940). 
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Portuguese, Latin, French, mathematics, science and accounting . They acquired a very 
strong discipline and were taught to see work as an ethical imperative and a way to 
personal fulfilment. The school education gave them the basic knowledge to continue 
their education at university (two sons became doctors) or to start their business life 
as farmers , traders, or modem industrial entrepreneurs. During the holidays, they 
went back to work at their father's plantation, workshops or trading establishments. 
They became familiar with relatives and a family business nerwork developed. 
When they fmished their studies each son and daughter was provided with a capital 
of 26 contos de reis (1/6 of the real cost of the first textile mill) to start their own 
businesses. Most of them used this money to buy a farm and slaves and pack mules 
to transport goods and begin trading. At the beginning, Bemardo and Caetano, the 
younger sons , invested their money buying and selling salt and cattle . Caetano became 
a farmer and Bernardo, with the support of his brother, planned to set up a textile 
mill. But this was an uncertain investment; the frrst factory, organized in Minas Gerais 
by two foreigners, had not succeeded. The father and some of the other brothers 
would not agree to support the new investment. Only the eldest brother, Antonio 
Candido, farmer , trader and capitalist, agreed to participate, but he insisted that the 
new mill had to be located near Paraopeba where he had his own business. Antonio 
Candido, as an experienced businessman, chose this site because it was easy for him 
to control his younger brothers and the new investment. Their slaves could work 
constructing the new factory. Their farm also provided timber for the factory 
buildings . Finally, the surrounding areas produced much cotton which could be 
obtained at a good price and with low transport cost. 13 
Eventually Bemardo left his first project to found a new mill in Juiz de Fora . He had 
many reasons to choose that town: there were many skilled workers in the region; the 
13Letter from Antonio Candido da Silva Mascarenhas to Melo Viana (10/8/ 1870) 
in CCC Letter Copier, p.243 . 
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Uniao and Industria road opened the way to Rio de Janeiro; it was easy lo get raw 
materials ; and was close to the regional coffee and Rio markets . In 1887, he realized 
his original plan, organizing the Bernardo Mascarenhas weaving mill in Juiz de 
Fora. 14 
Beroardo Mascarenhas as a moderniser 
In 1869, Bernardo, Caetano and Antonio Candido organized a fum to construct the 
first textile mill. They bought a farm where it was possible to use water for motive 
power. Bernardo was responsible for planning the new factory. He went to Rio de 
Janeiro to visit two modern working mills and to buy a sawmill and the tools and 
equipment necessary to set up a carpentry shop and smithy. These workshops were 
to prepare material needed to build the factory and houses for workers. He also signed 
a contract with Gme. Van Vlick Lidgerwood to buy textile machinery made by Arthur 
Danfort of Paterson, New Jersey (USA). By this contract, the agent had to send two 
skilled American workers to assemble the new mill. They had to stay for two years 
running the factory and training Brazilian workers. From Rio, Bernardo went to Itu 
(Sao Paulo) , and visited a textile mill that was being constructed with American 
machinery similar to that which he had ordered. 
The construction of the Cedro textile mill marked the beginning of Bernardo 
Mascarenhas' s career as a very successful industrial entrepreneur. The Cedro, a small 
textile mill with eighteen looms, began work in 1872. Its total cost was 142 contos 
of which the American machinery, ($19,668) amounted to 42.4 contos (1 conto= c.$ 
463) .16 The wages paid were very low and the price of cotton was cheap. The profit 
of the first year was 43.6 contos, a value greater than the total machinery cost. The 
14For more information about Bernardo Mascarenhas ' biography, see N L 
Mascarenhas Bernardo Mascarenhas: 0 Suno Industrial de Minas Gerais (Rio de 
Janeiro, 1954) . 
16 G M Mascarenhas op. cit . p.46 . 
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mill was so profitable that the total investment was recovered in three years 17. Twenty 
years later, a French engineer, teaching in the provincial capital, Ouro Preto, and 
referring to the mineiro mania, wrote that the new textile mills were "the real gold 
mines of Minas Gerais" . In 1893 some mills were declaring dividends as high as 
42 % 18. Organizing textile mills became a national mania. In Minas Gerais alone from 
1872 to 1900, 28 textile mills were set up, founeen in the central area and six in the 
north. Textiles were the most imponant industrial sector in Minas Gerais and in Brazil 
until the 1 920S19. 
The success of Cedro encouraged the other brothers to become partners but Cedro 
was a smal l factory producing cheaper fabrics used by slaves and sacks for agricultural 
products . Three brothers and one brother-in-law decided to organize a new firm to 
build another factory. They contracted for Bemardo to organize the Cachoeira textile 
mill. This invitation was very imponant to complete Bemardo's industrial engineering 
training. During the construction of Cedro, Bemardo started to learn English to be 
able to talk with the American workers. He improved his knowledge studying, reading 
and speaking with the Americans . In September 1874, Bemardo, as partner of the 
Mascarenhas & Barbosa finn , travelled to England to order machinery for the 
Cachoeira. Before buying, he went to the USA to examine American machines . 
Comparing the different equipment, he decided to buy the American ring spinning 
frame because it was more modem than the similar English machine. He went to the 
maker, Tenk, to learn how to assemble it. He went back to Manchester and there he 
bought fifty two looms and other mill machinery because the English equipment was 
17This general evaluation was done by Wells visiting the Cedro factory in that 
time. For more details , see J Wells Three Thousand Miles through BrazilJrom Rio 
de Janeiro (0 Maranhao (London, 1886) . 
18A Thire "L'Etat de Minas Gerais et sa Situation Economique Actuelle" Revista 
Industrial de Minas Gerais, Ouro Preto , Anno I, 10, Jan . 1894, p.241/3. 
19See D. Giroletti , op. cit. 1987 and S J Stein, op. cit. 
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cheaper than the American. Again, he went to British textile manufacturers to be 
trained in assembling their machinery. After ordering all the machinery for the new 
factory , Bernardo prepared a detailed plan and sent it to his youngest brother, 
Francisco, who was building the Cachoeira plant. From 1875 to 1876, Bernardo 
worked directly with two British skilled workers, contracted to assemble the Cachoeira 
factory , run the fabric production, and train Brazilian workers. At the beginning of 
1877, the Cachoeira factory started work. 
In 1877, Bernardo went back to manage the Cedro factory . While he was away his 
brothers were more interested in their farms than in supervising the factory which was 
left in the charge of unskilled workers , so that it began to make losses . Consequently , 
Bernardo again assumed charge at Cachoeira. He streamlined the administration and 
the ftrm again became profttable. Meanwhile, he also modernised the Cedro factory . 
The renovated Cedro began to work with 55 looms producing dyed and fme , rather 
than coarse fabrics , well made and more profttable. 
After completing the Cedro renovation, Bernardo convinced his brothers that it was 
time to train and appoint a new manager. He began to look for a reliable partner to 
share the Cedro factory management. The favoured candidate was Theophilo Marques 
Ferreira, married to Bernardo' s niece. He was an engineer working on the 
construction of the Pedro 11 Railway. Ferreira had become a family member by 
marriage and had a good education, professional experience and enough capital to be 
a new shareholder. It was the custom that only a substantial partner could be appointed 
to manage a factory . This practice became established as the rule in the new limited 
company . In March 1880, Theophilo was contracted as the Cedro deputy-manager, 
starting his practical training supervised by Bernardo. During the middle of 1882, 
Theophilo assumed responsibility as manager of the factory in place of Bernardo. 
Theophilo stayed as a manager until 1893 . From 1886 to 1889, as well as being 
Cedro manager, he became a Cedro and Cachoeira Company director, with overall 
10 
responsibility for both factories. Before fmishing his contract, Theophilo trained 
Francisco Bahia, the future manager of the Sao Vicente textile mill. 
Bemardo, founder of Cedro, became a partner of Cachoeira with the intention of 
selling the idea that the two factories should merge into only one limited company. He 
argued that they did not need to compete between themselves and if they combined 
they would become better equipped to compete against other factories. They would 
achieve greater economies of scale (more rationalized production and administration, 
a unified labour policy and so forth) and wider product range. Finally, Bemardo had 
seen the international trend for companies to merge , as was happening in England, 
France and America, and he wished their Brazilian companies to follow suit. The 
merger project was successfully accomplished in 1882 and the two factories were 
united under the control of the Cedro and Cachoeira Limited Company (CCC). 
Bemardo' s view was paramount in defming the organizational features of the new 
limited company. Through his influence the new partners maintained the same name, 
known by dealers and customers as a trade mark . He suggested the creation of a 
reserve fund saving 10 % of the general profit until they had 10 % of the total capital 
in order to renovate the machinery or expand their factories. In economic terms, the 
merged company became stronger . The factories expanded from 166 looms in 1885 
to 223 in 1886. And the profit increased continuously to a peak of 32 % in 189320. 
The CCC managers started to introduce some scientific labour management principles 
like wage incentives , and consumer and health services , in order to encourage the 
labourers to stay working at the factories . At the time there was no labour protection 
law for children, women or injured workers. They were paid only by the number of 
days worked. If they were injured at the factory , the workers had no health and wage 
protection . It was difficult to convince the partners , accustomed to the slave system, 
20 A M Vaz op. cit . p.82. 
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that some protection was desirable . Bemardo usually used the argument that these 
kinds of social measures were being introduced in more industrialized societies . This 
kind of labour policy was efficient in training and retaining the better paid Brazilian 
skilled workers but was not used with all the workers due to the slave society 
mentality and the easy availability of unskilled labourers .21 
On his second journey to England in 1878, Bernardo created another initiative that was 
very important for the future of Cedro and Cachoeira Company, for him as an 
industrial businessman and for many other Brazilian entrepreneurs . Visiting one 
English textile manufacturer, he was shown around by Robert L. Kerr, a British 
engineer working at the factory. Bemardo suggested to him that he should leave the 
company and set up a textile agency to sell equipment and other machines in Brazil 
and South America. To encourage Kerr to start his own business, he offered to pay 
a commission on all his machinery orders . Kerr organized his own enterprise in 
Manchester. They became friends and Bernardo signed a commercial agreement. 
Robert Kerr continued to be the CCC commercial agent into the twentieth century, 
exporting machinery, engaging skilled English workers and so on. Because of this 
agreement, Bernardo did not need to travel to England any more to buy new textile 
or other kinds of machinery . 
In 1882, Bernardo was invited to plan and assemble a new textile factory , Sao 
Sebastiao, for his father. He sent the plan and an order to Robert Kerr asking him to 
buy the machinery and contract British skilled workers to assemble it. During the 
construction of Sao Sebastiao, Bernardo trained two other entrepreneurs . These were 
21Many authors understated the facilities in using Brazilian workers by textile 
mills , writing "local labour adapted easily to industrial employment. .. " For example 
S J Stein, op. cit. p.50 and F R Versiani Industrial Investment in an "export " 
Economy: The Brazilian Experience before 1914 (London, ILAS, WP,1980 , p.1O. 
The entrepreneurial strategy to transform slaves into industrial workers is discussed 
in D Giroletti FGbrica Convento Disciplina (Belo Horizonte, 1991). 
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his brother, Victor, who would become manager of the Sao Sebastiao farm, and his 
nephew, Aristides Jose Mascarenhas . Victor became manager of the Sao Sebastiao 
factory and Aristides was his deputy-manager. Aristides was later elected director of 
CCC and became Cedro manager and superintendent of all the CCC factories from 
1895 to 1901. When Aristides resigned to join the Sao Sebastiao factory, there were 
no more Bemardo-trained entrepreneurs. The management succession failed and from 
1901 to 1912, the CCC had no professional managers , directors or superintendent 
managers. By 1911 the economy was in serious decline. A new direction and the 
market opportunities offered by the First World War then gave new life to the 
company. 
In 1887, Bemardo left the CCC and moved to Juiz de Fora. There he could fulftll his 
destiny as the most important Minas Gerais industrial entrepreneur in the three last 
decades of nineteenth century. In 1888, Bemardo organized his own small weaving 
factory to produce a special cloth with imported fibre, aiming to compete with 
imported fabric . The machinery was bought in Manchester by Robert Kerr. 
Bemardo extended his industrial capacity as founder or partner of many other 
important business and initiatives. He organized a building company with another 
partner. This company was responsible for building his factory and his workers' 
houses. In 1887, he was a founder of the Immigrant Improvement Society of Minas 
Gerais , which aimed to bring European labourers to work in the farms and in the 
cities22 • In 1889, he was a founder of the Commercial Academy, a secondary school 
to prepare Brazilian students to work in trading and service companies and factories. 
In the same year, he was one of the most credit-worthy founders and shareholders of 
the Banco de Credito Real of Minas Gerais . The Bank was organized with the capital 
22 N L Mascarenhas op. cit. p.104. 
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of many fanners , traders and manufacturers .23 Finally, Bernardo Mascarenhas was 
the main founder of the Mineira Electricity Company which began to generate and 
supply electricity in 1891 . 
In conclusion, Bernardo Mascarenhas was not only the founder of the modem textile 
industry and the promoter of many companies in Minas Gerais . His contribution to 
the modernization of Minas Gerais was wider because he trained many industrial 
managers and industrial workers . He prepared three generations of industrial 
managers in the CCc. In all the factories where he worked, Bernardo trained 
Brazilian workers to take the place of the high paid, skilled British workers .24 
In Juiz de Fora, Bernardo' s modernizing actions expanded even further, with the 
creation of his own textile mill and his participation in founding the Credito Real 
Bank and the Mineira Electricity Company. His contributions to improving the skilled 
labour market was not confmed to the Immigrant Society and the Commercial 
Academy in training many educated workers . Bemardo Mascarenhas died in 1899. 
Entrepreneurial efforts to update technology. 
How did Brazilian textile entrepreneurs respond to the need to keep up-to-date in 
technological terms? Industrial managers worked at the head of an internal network 
which provided them with information about local and regional markets . They studied 
regional newspapers and The Jornal do Commercio, the main national newspaper, to 
get information about the Rio de Janeiro market, then the main centre of consumption. 
Based on this , they calculated cost in relation to the Minas Gerais countryside, adding 
or reducing the transport cost. 
23D Giroletti Industrializa~tio de Juiz de Fora, 1850-1930 (Iuiz de Fora, 1988). 
24For more details about English skilled workers see D Giroletti Fdbrica Convento 
Disciplina, p.82-97 . 
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Because technology was produced abroad, the greatest challenge for Brazilian 
industrial entrepreneurs was how to keep up with innovations in machinery and fabric 
production processes . How did they update their knowledge? First, many Brazilian 
textile entrepreneurs hired American or English skilled workers. This was the best 
way to improve their knowledge about textile machinery and the production processes. 
From 1872 to 1896, the Cedro and Cachoeira factories had at least [WO foreign skilled 
workers as their employees . Many Brazilian entrepreneurs had to learn English to 
speak to their foreign employees. Bernardo started to learn English as a means to 
communicate with the American and English skilled workers who had arrived to 
assemble the Cedro, Cachoeira and Sao Sebastiao factories. During the Cedro 
assembling, they had contracted the special services of a Briton to translate from 
English to Portuguese and vice-versa for six months. At that time, 1872, Bernardo 
began to learn English and had improved his knowledge by talking and studying with 
the American and British workers. During the nineteenth century and until the middle 
of twentieth century French, not English, was taught as a second language in Brazilian 
secondary school s. 25 
25The textile "Mineiro" entrepreneurs were not the only ones to undergo the great 
English modernizing influence during the nineteenth century. lreneo Evangelista de 
Souza (1813/89), the greatest Brazilian entrepreneur, was trained under the English 
trader, Richard Carruthers. He learned to read and write in English and used the 
British accounting system. He also read British and American magazines and 
newspapers to stay up-to-date in new technology. He started as a Carruthers' employee 
and after some time he became his partner. In 1845, he began his career by 
developing important industrial projects including iron foundries , ship and railway 
construction, gas services and public lighting and set up a Amazonas river transport 
company, etc. After the 1860s he organized a bank which had branches in the most 
important Brazilian towns and in other South America cities like Montevideo and 
Buenos Aires and he also established branches in the world ' s major cities such as 
Paris, London and New York. For more details about the English influence in Souza's 
businesses , see A Faria lreneo Evangelista de Souza, Bariio e Visconde de Maud, 
1813 - 1889 (Rio, 1926); A Marchant Viscount Maua and the Empire of Brazil, a 
Biography of lrineu Evangelista de Souza, 1813 - 1889 (8erkeley, 1965). 
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Bernardo had a strong motivation to learn English as a condition to do business , and 
to organize textile factories and the hydroelectric schemes to produce electric power. 
Bernardo improved his English skills, not only talking with the British workers or 
reading technical books, but during his travels to England and the USA in 1874, and 
on his return to England in 1878. He could speak, read and write in English. In the 
same way , Francisco Mascarenhas, Cachoeira manager, began to learn English in 
1874 when that mill was being assembled and he continued to speak with the English 
workers and to read British books , newspapers and magazines. The textile managers 
of the second and third generation did not learn English, however, probably because 
the knowlodge of this language was no longer necessary . By then there were many 
Brazilian skilled workers employed at textile mills and some British workers living in 
Brazil had learned Portuguese. 
The second way to be up-to-date in technological terms was through reading English 
textile literature, books , magazines and newspapers . Many times during the nineteenth 
century, Brazilian textile entrepreneurs had complained to the government about the 
lack of textile manuals in Portuguese, arguing that they and their workers needed to 
study the textile techniques. Sometimes, they had suggested that the government print 
textile books for use in factories and schools, but at the end of the nineteenth century 
there were still manuals available in Portuguese. 
In order to get technological information, the Brazilian textile entrepreneurs had 
resorted to foreign literature, specially English material. Robert Kerr, the British 
machinery agent, was the channel to obtain this kind of book from England. For 
example, in 1883 the Cachoeira manager wrote to Kerr telling him that he had 
received three books about cotton spinning and the "Explaining Letter of Messrs 
Dobson & Barlow Co". In 1886, Bernardo, preparing to move to Juiz de Fora, wrote 
to Kerr: "1 am very willing to know something about electricity. Please send me about 
four or more good books about electric light, etc and information about the best 
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looms". In another letter to H. Lomay (Darwen), Bernardo requested information on 
modem looms that he had read about in the Textile Recorder2 6 
Possibly the best way to get technological information was by reading specialized 
English reviews, such as the Implement Machinery Review, which usually published 
short political and economic pieces and large articles about technological and machine 
improvement, referring to all industrial fields not only to textiles . Others, like the 
Textile Manufacturer and the Textile Recorder, were more specialized magazines 
related directly to textile machinery and business . These were probably more 
interesting to Brazilian entrepreneurs and represented their most important source of 
technological information during the nineteenth century. 27 
Another way to get technical information was by ordering textile machinery and 
product catalogues. Here, again , the services of Robert Kerr were vital, as we can see 
by his letters. For example, he wrote: "I have pleasure in accordance with your 
request in sending you four catalogues of various parts of George Hodgsons Looms 
for which there is no charge. "28 From 1894/95 when international competition to 
supply the Brazilian textile mill market increased, many foreign textile manufacturers 
started to send their product or machinery catalogues, unsolicited , to Brazilian textile 
mill owners. This gradually diminished not only the role of the commercial 
middleman, but also the British technological preeminence in the textile 
industrialization during the second hal f of the nineteentll century. 
26 D Giroletli Fdbrica ... p.94. 
27The Industrial Museum Archive "Decio Mascarenhas" , Caetanopolis , Minas 
Gerais, contains detailed subscriptions list cataloguing trade journals and newspapers 
ordered from overseas by members of the Mascarenhas family. 
28Companhia Ceareo Cachoeira "Livro de Cartas , 1894" , Robert Kerr to company 
manager, 19th July 1894, Industrial Museum Archive "Decio Mascarenhas ". 
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Conclusion 
With Bemardo Mascarenhas ' death in 1899, Minas Gerais lost her most competent 
industrial entrepreneur. It also marked the end of the more difficult Brazilian 
industrialization period when the country had no modem trained managers and no 
skilled workers to tackle the take- off stage of the industrial development process . The 
maintenance of slavery until 1888, while it may not have been incompatible with 
capitaist development in Brazil, hardly helped to stimulate modem industrial 
management, nor did it create new business initiatives . The Minas Gerais textile 
entrepreneurs were very successful not only in eliminating the negative heritage of 
slavery , one of the most important factor of the Brazilian industrial backwardness in 
last century, but also in training new industrial managers and in creating new 
businesses . As a consequence, their actions in assembling textile mills with the transfer 
of American or British technology were a very important step in the creation of 
Brazil ' s modem industrial and urban society. 
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Capital Goods and the Process of Industrialization in the Habsburg Monarchy, 
1870-1914 
Max-Stephan Schulze, London School of Economics 
Introduction 
The process of industrialization, its timing and pace are the themes which dominate 
much of recent research in Habsburg economic history! . Yet little attention has been 
focused on Austria-Hungary's capital goods sector, despite the country's position as 
one of the world's leading machinery producers2. In terms of total output and 
employment, the Habsburg Monarchy's machine-building industry was surpassed only 
by that in the United States, Britain, and Germanyl. 
Industrialization can be viewed as a process of increasing utilization of fixed capital 
over time4 . The machine-building industry5 is , then, a key sector for its "output 
I Good, Economic rise and 'Austria-Hungary '; Komlos, Customs union, and 
Stature, nutrition, and economic development; Rudolph, Banking and industrialization. 
2 An exception is Klima, 'Machine-building industry'. But studies comparable to 
Saul, ' Market and development', and 'Machine-tool industry' ; Floud, British machine-
tool industry; Barth, Entwicklungslininen; and Schroter and Becker, 
Maschinenbauindustrie have not been produced for the Habsburg Empire. 
Verein Deutscher Maschinenbau-Anstalten, Denkschrift iiber die 
Maschinenindustrie, pp.22, 26. The data reproduced in this source clearly refer only 
to Austria proper; they correspond exactly to figures provided in other sources . If 
output and employment in Hungarian machine-building are added to the respective 
figures for Austria, then the combined total is well above the level of Russian output, 
but still slightly below Russia's level of employment. 
4 Reitschuler, Stellung der Maschinenindustrie, p.3l. 
5 Because of the heterogeneity of the engineering sector's output there was no 
uniform usage or definition of the term machine-building at the time. However, 
reflecting this heterogeneity, the organizational structure of the German machine-
builders' association serves here to illustrate the scope of what will be referred to as 
mechanical engineering or machine-building. The association was organized in thirteen 
divisions relating to major product groups (each of them composed of several sub-
constitutes replacement of or additions to the economy's stock of physical capital "6. 
Indeed, recently presented evidence suggests not only a close long-run association 
between machinery investment and productivity growth at the macro level, but also 
the likely direction of causality: output per worker rose in the past because of high 
rates of investment in machinery7. Viewed in this light, rising expenditure on capital 
goods appears not as a mere concomitant of economic expansion but as a strategic 
factor accounting for growth. 
This essay focuses on the development of industrial machine-building and is thus 
concerned with some of the sectoral aspects of industrialization and economic growth. 
First, it will be argued that the new evidence from the capital goods sector supports 
the traditional notion of a Great Depression in Austria. The fmdings presented here 
cast doubt on the revisionist view that the Habsburg economy grew without major 
interruptions in the late nineteenth century8. Secondly, they also challenge Alexander 
Gerschenkron' s hypothesis that the more backward a country is at the time of its initial 
industrialization, the greater will be its stress on producer and capital goods rather 
than consumer goods9 . 
groups) : I: machine tools ; II : textile machines ; Ill: agricultural machines and 
implements; IV: locomotives; V: power machines; VI : working machinery; VII: plant 
equipment and machinery for iron and steel works and rolling mills; VIII : mechanical 
conveyors (cranes, lifts , elevators, etc .) and scales; IX: machinery for the paper-
making and graphical industries ; X: machinery for the food processing and chemical 
industries; XI: dressing/separation and crushing machines; XII : special machines and 
machinery parts ; XIII: apparatus ; VDMA, Denkschrift Uher die Maschinenindustrie , 
p.63 . This grouping is in accordance with the contemporary description of the sector 
in Fischer, 'Maschinenindustrie'. 
6 Rosenberg, 'Capital goods ' , p.143 . 
7 De Long, 'Productivity growth'. 
8 Good, 'Stagnation and ' take-off' . 
9 Gerschenkron, Economic backwardness. 
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Estimating Machinery Production 
Austrian output of machines was estimated in a three-stage process . As a first step, 
the gross value of production was approximated on the basis of wage-sum data given 
in the Austrian workers ' insurance statistics - though only for 1889 to 1911 W Fellner 
estimated output of Austrian machine-building for 1911113 within the framework of 
his national income calculations 11 • He approximated the "raw value of production" 
by applying a wage-sum/gross output ratio derived from Hungarian data to Austrian 
figures on wage-sums in machine-building . This concept has been utilized here as 
well. For 1897 to 1911, gross output of individual machine-building branches was 
estimated using Fellner's (1911) percentage shares of wages in gross output and then 
aggregated l2 . For 1889 to 1896, the statistics provide only the total wage-bill in 
machine-building. In these cases, the implied 1897 weighted average ratio was used. 
Thus a complete series of gross production in Austrian machine-building was obtained 
for 1889 to 1911 13 • 
10 Ministerium des Innem, Unfallstatistik 1889-1896, and Unfallstatistik 1897-
1901, 1902-1906, 1907-1911 . Included are Gruppe VI , Titel 166 to 184 (machinery, 
tools , apparatus) which correspond to the contemporary defmition of machine-building 
used in Bibliothek der Kammer der gewerblichen Wirtschaft fUr Wien, Vienna, Sign. 
IV.6316: Handelspolitische Zentralstelle, Gutachten zum autonomen Zolltarif: Die 
Entwicklung der osterreichischen Maschinenindustrie seit 1905 bis 1913, typescript, 
no place, no year, (herafter HKB Wien, Gutachten) , pp.6-8. 
11 Fellner, 'Volkseinkommen' , pp .558-572. 
12 Ibid ., Table VI, p.621. 
13 The assumption of a constant wage-bill /turnover ratio for either the industry as 
a whole or its individual branches is a simplification necessitated by the lack of more 
detailed data. The ratio varied not only between different branches of machine-
building, but within these between different companies and over the business cycle, 
too; HKB Wien, Gutachten, pp.3-8. But the overall ratio is unlikely to have displayed 
any significant upward or downward trend over time. Hoffrnann, for example , used 
labour incomes in the German metal-working industry as a proxy for output. His 
evidence shows that the shares of wages, depreciation and profits in (net) output 
remained fairly constant over the long run; Hoffrnann, Wachstum, pp.357-9. 
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Gross output in current prices was then converted into constant (1913) prices . Because 
of the almost complete lack of machinery output prices for Austria-Hungaryl4, a 
version of Hoffmann's index of German steam engine prices was used after 
adjustments had been made to account for Austrian rather than German iron and steel 
input prices 15 . 
As a second step in estimating output, an annual series for iron and steel consumption 
in Austrian machine-building (in 1000 metric tons) was compiled. This series is 
composed of twelve subseries, spanning the period 1870 to 1913 16 : 
Austrian iron and steel production: 
1. cast iron production 
2. steel production 
3. wrought iron production 
plus Austrian net imports of iron and steel : 
4 . net imports of cast iron 
5. net imports of bar iron and steel 
6. net imports of sheet metal and plate 
7. net imports of smelted iron and ingots 
minus Austrian non-machine-building iron and steel consumption: 
8. rail production 
9. production of railway related materials 
10. production of structural steel for construction purposes 
11 . iron and steel consumption in the metal-working industry 
14 Tinbergen, Cairncross and Feinstein faced similar difficulties in their attempts 
to construct price indices for British engineering. See Tinbergen, 'Business cycles', 
pp. 12-5, Table I A; Cairncross , Home andforeign investment, pp. 158-7; Feinstein, 
National income, p.188, Table 63. 
15 See Appendix. 
16 For sources and methods used see Appendix . 
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12. iron and steel consumption in the production of transport equipment. 
In a third step, the iron and steel input series was divided by the value of gross 
production of machines (as derived from wage-bill data) in constant (1913) prices . 
This procedure yielded a series of annual input-output ratios for 1889 to 1911 . While 
displaying annual fluctuations, this series shows a downward trend over time. Between 
the five-year averages centred around 1891 (1889/93) and 1909 (1907111), the ratio 
declined by an average rate of .97 per cent per annum. This rate was used to 
extrapolate the input-output ratio backwards (for 1870 to 1888) and forwards (for 1912 
and 1913) . Finally, the annual input-output ratios so obtained facilitated the estimation 
of machinery output for 1870 to 1888 and 1912 to 1913 on the basis of the previously 
derived iron and steel input series. The production of Hungary 's machine-building 
industry was approximated in essentially identical fashion, though as a consequence 
of lacking data the estimation had to rely on a thinner statistical basis than that for 
Austria . 
The Pattern of Output Growth 
The economic development of Austria-Hungary's machine-building industry was 
principally a reflection of the course which the Habsburg economy took in the late 
nineteenth century. Periods of expansion and phases of contraction in mechanical 
engineering generally coincided with those in the industrial sector at large . Just as 
overall industrial growth rates in Austria and Hungary were out of phase with one 
another between 1870 and 1913, so were the rates of expansion in the machine-
building industry. While Hungary's industrial sector grew at a more rapid pace than 
Austria ' s, Hungarian machinery output, too, increased at a faster rate than in the 
Western half of the Empire. In both countries, however, the rates of growth of 
engineering output over individual business cycles as well as over the full period under 
review differed markedly from those observed in other branches and the industrial 
economy at large. Though machine-building was an industry particularly exposed to 
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the impact of variations in the business cycle, it was also one of the most dynamic 
branches of industry . 
Table 1. Compound rates of growth ( % p .a.) 
Austria Hungary 
Mach.-Build. Industry' Mach.-Build. Industry' 
1872-1912 4.57 2.36 7.14 3.08 
1872-1894 2.57 2.07 7.93 3.47 
1894-1912 7.07 2.78 5.92 2.98 
1872-1882 -1.75 1.86 5.05 3.08 
1882-1894 6.31 2.32 11.72 3.82 
1894-1900 7.86 2.08 3.23 0.73 
1900-1912 6.67 3.24 7 .56 3.77 
Note: Peak-to-peak measurement. Since the peaks in the four series may not correspond exactly to one 
another the periods of measurement are not always identical. 
, manufacruring , mining , construction 
Sources: Appendix , Table A. I; KomJ os, Customs union, Appendix E, Table E.4. 
The new output estimates indicate that Austria 's machine-building industry took a 
course that was quite different from that implied in earlier research by Richard 
Rudolphl1 . Contrary to recently held views, the temporal pattern of output growth 
shows that the capital goods sector in the Western half of the Habsburg Monarchy was 
subject to a severe downturn and prolonged depression after the stock-market crash 
of 1873 18 • It was not until 1888 that the contraction of the I870s and the subsequent 
stagnation of the 1880s was fmally overcome as output reached again its pre-crash 
peak (Appendix, Table A. I) . This fmding amounts to fresh evidence in support of the 
17 Rudolph, 'Pattern of Austrian industrial growth' , Table 2, and Banking and 
industrialization, Table A.3 , p.207. 
18 Rudolph, Banking and industrialization, pp.28-9; Good, Economic rise, p. I65 . 
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controversial notion of a Grea! Depression which has featured so prominently in 
recent Austrian historiography . 
In the 1960s and early 1970s, Eduard Marz and Herbert Matis formulated what is now 
generally regarded as the traditional view of Austria's economic development in the 
latter half of the nineteenth centuryl9. Proceeding from a largely non-quantitative 
approach, both authors argue that economic growth in Austria conformed" .. . to the 
long-wave pattern that Kondratieff and others sketched out for the late nineteenth 
century"20. According to their hypothesis , the years 1873 and 1896 mark trend 
breaks . A long upswing from 1848 to 1873 was dominated by the rapid construction 
of railways. The 1873 crash rung in a downswing, the Great Depression, which was 
characterized by price deflation and low rates of growth of real output. The main 
driving forces of the new upswing which began in 1896 were the rise of new 
industries and the increase in demand associated with Austria-Hungary 's re-armament 
progranune21• This periodization of Austrian economic development and especially 
the view that the years between 1873 and 1896 is adequately understood as one of 
great depression was first challenged in 1974 by David Good22 . He estimated rates 
of growth of fmancial intermediary assets in Austria and translated them into GNP 
growth rates by using a fmance-income ratio originally calculated for several other 
countries. Good concludes that real per capita output in Austria grew at approximately 
the same rate between 1873 and 1896 as between 1896 and 1913 , and so rules out a 
break in secular trend in 1896. In terms of the behaviour of real output, he maintains 
19 Marz, 'Genesis der Schumpeterschen Theorie', and Industrie- und Bankpolitik; 
Matis, Osterreichs Winschaft. 
20 Good, Economic rise, p.163 . 
21 Marz, 'Wirtschaftliche Entwicklung ', p.368; Matis , Osterreichs Winschaft , 
p.1 9. 
22 Good, 'Stagnation and ' take-off '. 
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that, as in Britain, the Great Depression in Austria is essentially a myth23 . John 
Komlos challenged Good 's results and argues that output growth accelerated after the 
mid-1890s, following sluggish expansion during the preceding two decades1A • In 
support, Komlos draws on his own estimates of Austrian industrial output2S . The 
debate about Austria's Great Depression was resumed again in Good's 1984 synthesis 
of Habsburg economic history26. Though David Good rejects the traditional 
interpretation, his new estimates of real per capita regional product in the Habsburg 
Empire seem to provide evidence in its favour. Between 1890 and 1910, Austrian per 
capita output grew by more than double the rate than during the preceding twenty-year 
interval27 . 
Due to a lack of adequate data, the new output estimates presented here do not stretch 
further back than 1870 and, consequently , do not permit any inference about the early 
1870s as a break in the secular trend of Austrian machinery production. Thus no 
conclusions can be drawn on the validity of the long-wave concept as such. But the 
experience of Austria' s machine-building industry in the 1870s and 1880s clearly 
diverged from its course in the following two decades , when output growth was 
markedly faster. This result has major implications for an understanding of the timing 
and pace of Austrian economic development. 
23 Ibid .. Saul , Myth. 
24 Komlos , 'Depression in Austria '; for Good's response to the criticism see 'Great 
depression' . 
2S Komlos , Customs union, Appendix C, pp.243-51 , and Appendix E, Table EA. 
26 Good , Economic rise , pp. 162-85 and Komlos, Review of Good, Economic rise. 
27 Good, ' Austria-Hungary ', Table 11.3 , p.230. It should be emphasized that the 
increase in per capita output growth was achieved in a period characterized by an 
acceleration in the rate of Austrian population growth; Fischer, 'Wirtschaft und 
Gesellschaft' , Table 3, p .14. 
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The link that justifies using a section series like machinery production for making 
main economic inferences is the nature of the machine-building industry's output, 
which constitutes replacements or additions to the capital stock of an economy28. If 
the domestic machine-building industry produces primarily for the domestic market 
and if it holds a dominant share in this market, conditions that both apply in the 
Habsburg case, then changes in the rate of growth of machinery production are likely 
to reflect changes in investment demand in the economy. The revisionist thesis, which 
postulates steady and uninterrupted growth in the Austrian economy from 1870 to 
1913, implies that no significant differences in the rate of machinery investment 
existed between the subperiods in question29 . 
It is argued here that, when aggregate demand for industrial goods flrst contracted and 
then slowly recovered in the 1870s and early 1880s, machinery users disposed over 
an enlarged capital stock which had been built up in the preceding boom years. 
Machinery purchases were thus largely confmed to replacements only. Sluggish 
manufacturing growth led to low levels of net investment in capital goods and a 
further fall in levels of demand for machinery, which were already depressed due to 
the collapse in railway construction3O • This state of the Austrian machinery market 
in the 1880s is well reflected in the experience of individual machine-building firms. 
The growth of engineering companies and the related rise of capital requirements were 
restricted . In response to slow growth of output and insufficient capacity utilization, 
investment in new production equipment remained low throughout the decade. As a 
result of very low or even negative rates of net investment the average value of fixed 
assets and plant equipment actually fell between 1880 and 1890. It was not until the 
28 Rosenberg , 'Capital goods', p.143 . 
29 This holds to the extent that similar rates of growth of an economy's output 
require roughly similar rates of investment, i.e. no abrupt changes in the structure of 
the economy take place which alter the output- investment ratio. 
30 Schulze, 'Machine-building industry', pp. 31-9. 
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close of the century that Austrian machine-building companies substantially expanded 
their production capacity to meet the rising demand for their outpue l . All available 
evidence, whether it be the growth of domestic machinery production, the investment 
behaviour of machine-building ftnns, or the changes in machinery imports32, points 
to low levels of demand for machinery during most of the 1870s and 1880s. It was 
only in the last two decades before the First World War that, responding to renewed 
investment demand , output growth in Austrian engineering accelerated and surpassed 
that in most other sectors of the industrial economy. But Austria' s machine-building 
industry displayed a pattern of development that is not compatible with this view. 
However, apart from the function as a provider of capital goods the rest of the 
economy, there is a further important reason why the machine-building sector should 
be looked at: it was a sector of considerable size and as such influenced directly the 
volume of total industrial output. This holds especially for Austria. The effects of 
expansion and contraction in machine-building on total value-added in manufacturing 
are illustrated in Table 2. Incorporating value-added in machine-building into Kornlos ' 
manufacturing series for Austria widens markedly the already signiftcant gap in 
growth rates between the two periods 1872-1895 and 1895-1912. Moreover, it further 
accentuates the pattern of a depression composed of two distinct business cycles with 
a particularly severe recession during the ftrst cycle (1872-84)33 . 
31 Ibid., pp. 102-7. 
32 Ibid., Table V. I , p. I44 . 
33 A proportion of 53 per cent was used to convert gross output (Appendix, Table 
A. I) into value-added in machine-building; Fellner, ' Volkseinkommen' , pp.570-1. It 
should be noted, however, that for a more complete and accurate assessment of the 
machine-building industry 's relative contribution to total industrial growth in Austria 
the output of all those branches of industry not included in Kornlos ' manufacturing 
index would need to be estimated, too. 
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Table 2. Growth of manufacturing (% p.a.) 
Austria Hungary 
A B A B 
1872-1895 2.31 2.18 4 .92 4.48 
1895- 1912 3.27 2.68 3.71 3.47 
1872-1884 1.77 1.90 6.06 5 .80 
1884-1895 2.91 2.51 4.13 3.58 
Key: A = including machine-building B = eXCluding machine-building 
Notes: Peak-to-peak measurement . Since the peaks in the four series may not correspond exactly to 
one another the periods of measurement are not always identical. Calculations based on sum of value-
added not adjusted for variation in the compos ition of the aggregate . 
Sources: Appendix , Table A. I ; Komlos, Customs ullioll , Appendix E, Tables E.5 and E.6. 
The Structure of Manufacturing Output and Late Industrialization 
The consumer goods industries continued to hold a dominant share of total 
manufacturing output throughout the period under review34 • As late as 1911 , the 
textiles, clothing, and foodstuffs branches accounted for almost 50 per cent of value 
added in Austria ' s manufacturing industry3s. In Hungary , this share was only slightly 
lowef6. But it was, to a large extent, the producer goods sector, including 
mechanical engineering, that carried industrial expansion forward in the late nineteenth 
century37 Faster than average long-run rates of growth in machine-building might 
have been expected, as both agriculture and industry shifted to increasingly complex 
and capital-intensive production processes which translated into an acceleration in the 
34 Gross , ' Industrialization in Austria ', Table 15, p.70 . 
35 Ibid . 
36 Fellner, 'Volkseinkommen', pp.548-56 . 
37 See Komlos, Customs union , Tables E.5 and E.6, for a sectoral breakdown of 
value-added in manufacturing. 
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growth of demand for capital goods. But expansion of industrial machine-building in 
fact gained such a momentum that this sector became one of the main sources of 
growth in industry. This holds especially for Austria after full recovery from the Great 
Depression had been achieved. Measured over the whole period 1870 to 1913 , 
machinery output grew faster in Hungary than in Austria. But since Hungarian 
industry as a whole, too, expanded at a higher rate, the impact of engineering growth 
on total manufacturing growth was somewhat smaller in Hungary than in the Western 
half of the Empire during most cycles (Tables 1 and 2) . 
Nachum Gross concluded in his thesis that "Long-run industrial growth in nineteenth-
century Austria was not sufficiently rapid to make her economy relatively less 
backward at the end of the period than it had been in the middle of the century "38. 
Though drawing only on growth rates and thus ignoring the qualitative changes in the 
composition of total industrial output, this statement refers to some of the core 
elements of the debate about the path of the Habsburg Monarchy 's industrialization. 
The data that are available show that modern economic growth began during the mid-
1820s in the Western regions of the Empire, yet without displaying any signs of a 
Gerschenkronian great spurt or Rostovian take-ojf9 . But up to the early 1870s, 
output growth was not as fast as to keep pace with the more advanced nations of 
Western Europe. The degree of Austria-Hungary ' s relative economic backwardness 
probably increased between 1820 and 187040 . Recent comparative research has 
produced results which suggest that, in relative terms, economic growth in the 
Habsburg Monarchy accelerated during the four decades under review. Between 1870 
and 1910, Austria-Hungary's real per capita product grew faster than in most Western 
European countries. As a result, the gap in per capita output levels to Great Britain, 
38 Gross , 'Industrialization in Austria ' , p.96. 
39 Good, 'Austria-Hungary', pp.221 -5; Komios , Customs union, pp.90-1I I. 
40 Good, 'Austria-Hungary', pp.225-8. 
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France, Belgium, and, to a lesser extent, GeIIDany, narrowed. "By 1914", David 
Good remarks, "the Empire's position relative to Western Europe was no better and 
may have been somewhat worse than a century before, and it had lost out to GeIIDany 
for political dominance of Central Europe. But in its fmal four decades the Empire 
began to 'catch-up' "41. 
Most of this 'catching-up' , it should be stressed, took place in the last two decades 
before World War I, i.e. during the period which the traditionalists in Austrian 
historiography view as marked by a renewed long-run upswing after the end of the 
Great Depression. Real per capita output in Austria rose by only 0.9 per cent on 
annual average between 1870 and 1890, but by more than 2 per cent between 1890 
and 1910; similar rates of growth are calculated for Hungary42. This acceleration in 
per capita output growth matched changes in the rate of growth of machine-building 
and the rising contribution of the machine-building sector to total industrial production 
observed here . There is evidence suggesting that the improvements in macro-economic 
productivity measured by Good may have been causally linked to changes in 
machinery investment, which are reflected in the output series for the machine-
building industry. 
In a study covering six major industrial countries during the past century , Bradford 
De Long detected a strong association of machinery investment and per capita income 
growth4J Moreover, his regression results indicate that machinery investment was 
more strongly associated with GDP per capita growth than investment in general 
(including non-residential construction investment). Even if allowance is made for 
political stability and investment in education , two factors often regarded as a key to 
growth, the magnitude and significance of the coefficient on machinery investment is 
41 Ibid. , p.229. 
42 Ibid ., Table 1l.3 , p.230. 
4) De Long, ' Productivity growth'. 
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not reduced . The problem is , of course, whether causation runs from machinery 
investment to economic growth or from growth to machinery investment. If faster 
growth causes higher investment because of rising profit expectations, then investment 
should respond equally to increases in output resulting from improved productivity 
(higher per capita incomes) and to those caused by population growth. "It should not 
matter whether larger demand comes from having more consumers or richer 
consumers"44. De Long's regression results show a strong association between output 
per capita growth and machinery investment and a weaker and imprecisely estimated 
association between population growth and machinery investment. He thus argues that 
"Intensive growth that raises productivity and income levels is especially strongly 
associated with machinery investment"45. He estimates that each additional percentage 
point of total output allocated to machinery investment raises output per worker by 
more than half a percentage point per annum. This is a high estimate and it may result 
from the fact that the nations included in the sample are today wealthy and 
successfully industrialized countries; the high coefficient may, to some extent, reflect 
the good luck that these economies had in the past. Those economies that have grown 
most rapidly in the past have been those that have invested heavily in machinery46. 
Given the temporal coincidence of changes in per capita output and those in machinery 
production, it seems plausible to view the rise in productivity in the Habsburg 
Monarchy as an outcome of increased machinery investment. 
However, the conclusion that mechanical engineering was at the core of industrial 
expansion in late nineteenth century Austria-Hungary does not amount to a 
corroboration of Alexander Gerschenkron's hypothesis that the capital goods sector 
was likely to dominate over the consumer goods industries in the process of 
44 Ibid ., p.3l7 . 
45 Ibid . 
46 Ibid ., p.323 . 
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industrialization of follower countries, like the Habsburg Empire47 . Industrialization 
in Austria started much earlier in the nineteenth century and rested to a large degree 
on advances in the textile industries . In Hungary, the fIrst widespread wave of 
industrialization in the 1870s and 1880s was dominated by the rise of flour milling. 
What has been observed here is that the machine-building industry, as part of the 
capital goods sector, became an increasingly important source of economic growth in 
a period after initial industrialization. This fInding could be interpreted as evidence in 
support of Walter Hoffmann's hypothesis that over the process of industrialization the 
consumer goods industries lose their dominant position in favour of the capital goods 
sector, including iron and steel , metals and engineering48. However, what has been 
shown is that among those manufacturing branches for which comparable output 
estimates are available, the machine-building industry belonged to the most rapidly 
advancing sectors in both Austria and Hungary . It should be kept in mind , though, 
that these branches do not represent the full range of manufacturing OUtput49 . Any 
inference about trend shifts from the consumer goods sector to the capital goods sector 
would require a more complete coverage of industrial sectors and an analysis of the 
input-output relationships necessary to allocate outputs between them50 For Austria-
Hungary the essential data are not available. 
The domestic machine-building industry was able to make a major contribution to 
economic growth in the Habsburg Empire in the face of difficult circumstances. The 
47 Gerschenkron, Economic backwardness . 
48 Hoffmann, Growth of industrial economies, pp.31 -41 , 145-159. The empirical 
basis of Hoffmann's concept has been criticized by O'Brien, 'Typology' , pp .3 1O-1.7 
49 Komlos' estimates of manufacturing output, which have been used here for 
comparative purposes and the measurement of the machine-building industry ' s 
contribution to industrial growth, are based on eight sub-series (beer, iron, distilled 
spirits, sugar, cotton textiles , woollen textiles, flour, electricity); Komlos, Customs 
union, Appendix E, Tables E.5 and E.6. 
50 O'Brien, 'Typology ', pp.31O-1. 
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fmdings presented here suggest interpreting the industry' s perfonnance largely in 
tenns of its response to the prevailing market conditions . Nathan Rosenberg has shown 
that the efficient operation of a capital goods sector is critically dependent on a 
sufficiently high level of demand for capital goods permitting output specialization51 . 
Though Rosenberg refers to specialization at the fInn level , the concept can also be 
used to explain the composition of output at industry level. The growth in machinery 
output, and its variation over time, was associated with changes in the structure of the 
machine-building industry's output. These changes were detennined by shifts in the 
absolute and relative size of product markets . Austria-Hungary' s machinery producers 
focused on the manufacturing of those machines for which the domestic economy 
provided sufficiently large markets. The available data for Hungary indicate an 
engineering sector which, by the turn of the century, was capable of providing 
increasingly diverse and complex outputs . But steam technology , agricultural 
machinery and implements , and plant and equipment for the food processing industries 
accounted for particularly high shares in total machinery OUtpUf2. In the early 1870s, 
at a time of rising demand associated with rapid railway construction, locomotive 
engineering was probably the most important single branch of Austria' s machine-
building industry . However, as later in Hungary, its relative importance declined over 
time as the fall in the rate of new railway building brought with it a decline in demand 
for railway related output. Operating in a country with a large agricultural sector, both 
in absolute terms and relative to industry , the machine-building industry was 
increasingly geared to the provision of agricultural machinery, demand for which was 
secularly rising as a result of mechanization and the spread of more capital intensive 
farming techniques . Power machines like steam engines and, at a later stage, internal 
combustion engines were used in virtually all branches of industry. The market for 
these machines was thus substantially larger than that for highly specialized machinery 
like machine-tools or spinning machines which found use only in a limited number of 
51 Rosenberg, 'Capital goods ', p.143 . 
52 Schulze, 'Machine-building industry ', pp .39-48, 74-87. 
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industries . Moreover, proximity to the predominantly agricultural economies of 
Eastern and South-Eastern Europe helped widening the market. Exports accounted for 
a substantial share of domestic production of agricultural machinery. Though the 
argument does not account for the increasing specialization in steam technology, it 
appears that Austria-Hungary 's tariff structure, too, had some bearing on the pattern 
of output specialization. At least part of the shift towards the production of agricultural 
equipment, with a relatively low iron and steel content per unit of output, can be 
explained as a response to high tariffs on iron and steel inputs53 . 
Conclusions 
The absolute and relative rise of the machine-building industry under at times adverse 
conditions bears witness to the underlying dynamism and increasing complexity of the 
Habsburg economy in the late nineteenth century. Rising macro-economic productivity 
was, to a considerable extent, facilitated by investment in domestically produced 
machinery. These results thus fit in well with what now seems to emerge as consensus 
among Habsburg scholars , namely, that the long-held view of Austria-Hungary' s 
economic development as essentially one of failure can no longer be accepted54. 
However, Austrian economic growth between 1870 and 1913 was not a process of 
smooth, uninterrupted expansion. Rather it unfolded in two major phases: sluggish 
growth up to the rnid-I 890s and an acceleration in economic activity thereafter. In 
short, Austria ' s depression after 1873 is not a myth but an integral part of her growth 
experience. 
53 Ibid. , pp. 178-89 . 
54 See Good, Economic rise, pp.237-55 , and ' Austria-Hungary' , pp.225-9; 
Komlos , Review of Good, p.452. The most recent exposition of the failure hypothesis 
is Gerschenkron, Economic spun that failed . 
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APPENDIX 
Austrian and Hungarian Output of Machinery 
(1) Results 
Table A. 1. Austro-Hungarian Machine-Builiiing 
Iron & Steel Input Real Output Nominal Output 
(1000 Tons) (Mill. Crowns) (M ill. Crowns) 
Austria Hungary Austria Hungary Austria Hungary 
1870 110.50 17.06 61.35 7.89 109.54 14.08 
1871 138.75 22.55 77.80 10.51 145.58 19.66 
1872 187.59 21.64 106.21 10.17 199.39 19.09 
1873 162.58 20.06 92 .95 9.50 174.87 17.87 
1874 102.09 15 .09 58.94 7.21 112.40 13.74 
1875 102.36 16.53 59.67 7.96 111.09 14.81 
1876 101.03 25 .08 58.48 12.18 103.36 21.16 
1877 94.01 22.69 55 .89 11.11 92.55 18.40 
1878 112.97 20.06 67.82 9.90 106.31 15.52 
1879 97 .92 20.86 59.36 10.39 92 .31 16.16 
1880 106.90 20.81 64.43 10.45 97 .56 15 .58 
1881 128.59 31.67 79.48 16.05 117.03 23 .63 
1882 142.59 32.93 89.00 16.83 127.13 24 .04 
1883 139.65 38.21 88 .02 19.71 123.57 27.67 
1884 124.94 39.67 79.52 20.64 112.78 29.28 
1885 126.62 39.89 81.37 20.94 114.61 29.50 
1886 105 .85 31.62 68.69 16.76 92.61 22 .59 
1887 117.84 32.99 77.22 17.64 101.17 23 .12 
1888 165 .10 46.98 109.25 25.36 138.91 32.24 
1889 185 .71 46.57 112.94 25 .37 142.95 32. 11 
1890 193.71 63 .71 126.33 35 .04 159.58 44 .27 
1891 199.91 65 .26 138.33 36.23 176.23 46.16 
1892 207. 18 84.03 146.21 47. 11 186.84 60.20 
18 
1893 215.00 104.38 163.81 59.09 20l. 75 72.78 
1894 27 l. 42 108.43 185.48 61.99 221.19 73.92 
1895 285.70 115.67 191.21 66.79 225.16 78 .64 
1896 318.64 121.49 203.66 70.86 236.16 82.16 
1897 328.62 124.94 220.28 73.61 252.27 84.30 
1898 364.20 130.38 245 .70 77.60 282.38 89.19 
1899 386.73 135.66 270.30 81.59 307.93 92.95 
1900 380.74 136.38 292.01 82.88 329.68 93.57 
1901 381.18 133.93 284.36 82.25 328.27 94.95 
1902 350.13 138.17 260.43 85 .77 304.34 100.23 
1903 347.77 128.02 279.79 80.33 307.55 88.30 
1904 374.46 135 .93 307.29 86.22 320.95 90.05 
1905 419.10 155 .42 326.25 99.68 344.03 105 .11 
1906 455.72 169.43 376.02 109.88 395 .51 115 .58 
1907 531.10 198.36 431.98 130.10 452.79 136.37 
1908 620.70 237.10 463.42 157.29 496.05 168.36 
1909 550.25 21 3.89 454.07 155 .07 491.73 167.93 
1910 565 .59 242. 38 450.20 160.49 478.37 170.53 
1911 561.08 230.96 493.83 156.32 504.2 1 159.60 
1912 760.36 268.82 634.15 177.73 641.37 179.76 
1913 684. 12 240 .77 576.16 169.43 576.16 169.43 
(2) Contemporary Output Measures and Wage-Bill Data 
Austria : See main text. Hungary: Though fairly comprehensive spot estimates of 
output are available for 1898 and 1906 (see Table A.2 below), wage-bill data from the 
Hungarian accident insurance statistics which could be used for further approximations 
of output exist only for 1909 and 191 2; see Munkas-biztositasi HivataJ , lelentese az 
orszdgos munkcisbetegsegelyz6 es baleset-biZlosit6 penztdr miik6deser6l 1909-1912 
VIII ., tetelszama 199-214, 2 19, 254-255 . It was, therefore, assumed that the 
input/output ratio in Hungarian machine-building moved along a path similar to that 
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in Austrian machine-building . A linear trend line was fitted to the series of Austrian 
input/output ratios (1870-1913) . Since the input/output ratios implied in the Hungarian 
data for 1909 to 1912 are on average 21 per cent above the Austrian trend figures, the 
trend of the Austrian input/output ratio was adjusted accordingly before being applied 
to the Hungarian iron and steel input series for an estimation of Hungarian machinery 
output (1870-1908; 1913). 
(3) Iron and Steel Inputs 
Subseries I to 9. Austria and Hungary: For a detailed discussion of the methods and 
sources used in the derivation of iron and steel production, net imports of iron and 
steel and the production of rails and railway related materials see Schulze, 'Machine-
building industry' , Appendix A, pp.206-215 , 242-244, and Tables A.7 to A.lO , A.16 
to A.19 . 
Subseries 10. Austria: for 1887 to 1911 , data on the cartelized iron works ' domestic 
sales of support iron (Trager), primarily used in construction, and their combined 
exports of bar iron, support iron and plate, are given in Handelsministerium, 
'Materialien zur Kartellenquete 1912', Absclmitt III Table VIII, pp.12-13. Exports of 
support iron were isolated using its share in domestic sales of bar iron, support iron 
and plate. Thus an estimate of total Austrian output of support iron was obtained for 
1887 to 1911. This series was then extrapolated backwards (1870-1888) and forwards 
(1912-1913) using the average 1887-1891 and 1907-1911 shares in total wrought iron 
and steel output. According to Kartellengnete, practically all Austrian production of 
support iron was cartelized by the 1880s. However, the series so obtained is still likely 
to reflect only the minimum of iron and steel consumption in construction. In 
Germany, for example, support iron accounted on average for only 78 per cent of 
domestic shipments of structural shapes (1908-1912); see Kaiserliches Statistisches 
Amt, Statistisches lahrbuch 1915 (Berlin, 1915) , p.117, and Institut fUr 
Konjunkturforschung, Dynamik des Baumarkts, p. 63 . Hungar:y: Hungarian production 
of structural steel was approximated by applying the share of support iron output in 
total Austrian output of wrought iron and steel to total Hungarian output of wrought 
iron and steel. 
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Subseries 11 and 12. Austria: Using the 1889 to 1911 wage-bill data provided in the 
Unjallstatistik and Fellner' s wage-sum/gross output ratios, output in the metal-working 
industry (Gruppe Vb, Titel 109-141) and in transport equipment production (Gruppe 
VIb, Titel 184a-190) had been estimated in a fashion identical to that used for 
machine-building. I then computed the value of input materials as a percentage of 
output in these industries and in machine-building on the basis of the ratios provided 
in Fellner, 'Volkseinkommen' , p.571. The quantity of iron and steel used in each 
industry was then determined by multiplying its share in the total value of input 
materials with total iron and steel consumption (net of subseries 9 to 11). For the 
years with missing value data (1870-1888; 1912-1913) , iron and steel quantities were 
allocated by using the average 5-year shares for 1889-1893 and 1907-1911 , 
respectively . Hungary: Hungary's use of iron and steel in metal-working (titles 141 
to 174 of the Hungarian accident insurance statistics) and in the production of 
transport equipment (titles 215-218, 220-222) was approximated in the same way as 
for Austria. However, since Hungarian wage-bill data are available only for 1909 to 
1912, iron and steel quantities were allocated between the machine-building, metal-
working and transport equipment industries using their respective consumption shares 
in 1909 and 1912 for the years with missing value data (1870-1908 and 1913) . 
(4) The Price Index 
Hoffmann observed a close correlation between steam engine prices and iron prices 
and used the latter to interpolate and extrapolate missing annual values of the steam 
engine price index; Hoffmann, Wachstum , pp.571 -574. Regressing Hoffmann's index 
of derived steam engine prices on iron prices and a time trend yielded this result for 
1870 to 1913 (44 observations): 






F(2, 41 ) 
2.101 
3422.4 
where CNT = constant term; LIP(-2) = log of iron prices , lagged two years; T = 
time trend; R2 = corrected coefficient of determination; DW = Durbin-Watson test 
statistic ; F = F test statistic; t-statistics are given in parentheses. Assuming that 
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Austrian machinery prices were equally responsive to changes in iron prices and 
subject to a similar downward trend, the estimated coefficients were then employed 
in an approximation of Austrian machinery prices using an index of Austrian iron and 
steel prices . A Laspeyres index was constructed as a weighted arithmetic average of 
price relatives for iron and steel inputs . Four series of price relatives are included: 
(a) average price per ton of Austrian cast iron at place of production (19l3 = 100; 
weight: .2778); 
(b) average price per ton of Hungarian cast iron at place of production (19l3 = 100; 
weight: .0434) ; 
(c) price per ton of imported cast iron inclusive of tariff (1913 = 100; weight: 
.2288); 
(d) wholesale price of bar iron in Vienna (1911112113 = 100; weight: .450) 
According to a study by the German Machine-Builders ' Association, cast iron and bar 
iron -by far the two most important engineering material inputs - had a share of 40 to 
50 per cent and 30 to 35 per cent, respectively, in the total volume of iron used in 
machines; VDMA Denkschrift Uber die Maschinenindustrie, p.39. These percentages 
have been used to compute weights with which to combine four input price series. As 
no continuous price data for other raw materials and semi-fmished inputs are available, 
the weight share of cast iron has been raised to 55 per cent, that of bar iron to 45 per 
cent. The three prices for cast iron have been weighted according to the average 1870 
to 1913 shares of Austrian cast iron , Hungarian cast iron and imported cast iron, 
respectively, in total Austro-Hungarian cast iron consumption. The lack of adequate 
price data does not permit the construction of a separate price index for Hungarian 
machine-building. The price index is, therefore, used for deflating estimated machine-
building output in both Austria and Hungary . Hence Hungarian cast iron prices have 
been included as well. Import prices for cast iron apply to both countries alike because 
of their common customs border. For sources see Schulze, 'Machine-building 
industry ', Appendix A, Tables A.7, A.8 and A.16; Appendix C, Tables C.l and C.4. 
(5) An Evaluation of the New Estimates 
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Austria: Converting the new estimates from constant into current prices allows for a 
comparison with contemporary accounts of Austrian machinery production. However, 
as a consequence of changes in the data collection procedures, the three Austrian 
industrial surveys of 1870, 1880 and 1885 do not present fully compatible sets of 
information; see Gross, ' Industrialization in Austria' pp.167-185, and 'Austrian 
Industrial Statistics 1880/85 ' , pp.39-48. Nachum Gross has pointed out that "they 
cannot be utilized for determining short-run trends of development" ; Gross , 
' Industrialization in Austria', p.173 .. But the results of these surveys nevertheless 
prove useful in evaluating the new estimates derived here. If the quality of the survey 
data suffers mainly from incomplete coverage of the various industries, then the 
reported output levels in each industry are likely to represent minima. In general, a 
firm had to pay more than 42 florins business tax for inclusion in the 1880 industrial 
survey. In the 1885 survey, the limit was lowered to 21 florins in Vienna and 10 .5 
florins anywhere else. Both surveys stress that the reported output figures are 
minimum values. Similarly, the value of output reported in the 1870 survey is largely 
that of ' factory establishments' only, though some small-scale manufacturers had been 
included in the survey, too. See Handel sministerium, 'Statistik der osterreichischen 
Industrie 1870,1880, 1885' , NIHV, vols. 3, (1874) No .2, p.173; 28 (1884), pp. VIII-
X, 94-97; 38 (1888/89), pp. VII-VIII, 106-109. Cf. Gross , 'Industrialization in 
Austria' , p. 170. The reported 1870 level of machinery output (89.78 million crowns) 
understates the actual level for a further reason . While production is that of machinery 
only, the number of workers involved in the generation of this output includes also 
workers in firms which produced both railway waggons or ships and machinery. 
Accounting for this mismatch yields a corrected value of output per worker which was 
then used to re-calculate total output on the basis of the total corrected machine-
building labour force (including those in firms whose output was not recorded and 
excluding the number of workers wrongly assigned to machine-building). For 1870, 
an adjusted value of machinery output of 109.23 million crowns was obtained. The 
contemporary spot estimates of production in Austrian machine-building can thus be 
seen as lower limits against which to measure the new output estimates. Estimated 
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output is very close to the minimum level for 1870. The value of production appears 
as not being over-estimated and one may thus assume that no downward bias has been 
introduced into computed long run growth of output. For 1880 and 1885 the new 
estimates are well above the benchmarks. Though the divergence may to some extent 
be explained by cyclical variations in the actual input-output ratio, it seems more likely 
that the contemporary approximations are indeed reflecting only a part of total output 
in the industry . This holds especially for 1880. However, assuming the difference 
between the output estimates were to originate from an over-estimation of input (and 
thus output) levels for 1880 and 1885 , the argument put forward here, namely that the 
rate of expansion during this period was considerably slower than assumed so far , 
would be strengthened further. For the survey data imply a fal] in nominal output 
between 1870 and 1885. If anything , the implied rates of growth of output over all 
business cycles are upwardly biased because of the use of a highly deflationary price 
index. Since Austrian iron and steel prices fell more rapidly over the period than 
German prices and since we assumed a similar time trend reflecting productivity 
advances , the index of Austrian machinery prices declines more rapidly than 
Hoffmann's index for Germany, yet not nearly as fast as business equipment prices 
in the United States; Gallman, and Howle, 'Fixed Reproducible Capital ', Table 5, 
p.209 . However, one could argue that due to larger market size the scope for 
specialization and productivity growth was somewhat wider in Germany than in 
Austria. The growth rates of machinery output presented here thus represent probable 
upper limits . The increase in the iron and steel input series, in contrast, can be seen 
as the lower limit of expansion in machine-building, given an implicitly constant 
input/output ratio . Hungary: The new output estimates are well above of what one 
might regard as minimum levels of Hungarian machinery output. In 1898, only 
establishments employing more than 20 people were surveyed; Kereskedelmiigyi 
Miniszter, 'Gep-gyaruis 1898' ppA-5. Eight years later, an even more restrictive 
defInition of factory establishment was used as some of the smaller establishments 
included in the 1898 survey were omitted; Kozponti Statisztikai Hivatal, Gydripar 
1906, p.546. Thus, a presumably signifIcant number of smaller producers were not 
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included in the surveys and, as a result, their output was not recorded. The activity 
of railway repair shops - which employed about one-third of the total workforce in 
engineering - was considered, too . As the surveys emphasize, many of these did not 
only carry out repair work but were engaged in the production of completely new 
machinery. Their output, though, is not included in the total for mechanical 
engineering but recorded separately (see Table A.2) . Both factors - the restricted scope 
of the two surveys and the exclusion of machinery production in railway repair shops-
suggest a downward bias in the contemporary output estimates . Viewed in this light, 
the new output estimates presented here seem plausible; they are certainly in the right 
order of magnitude . 
















189 6 1. 67b-9l.30c 89.19 
190 89.00b-25.3SC 115 .58 
Sources: ( I) Handelsministerium, ·Statistik der osterreichischen Industrie 1870, 1880, 1885" , NIHV, 
vols . 3 (1874) No.2, pp.108, 145-146, 149-154, 157-158, 160, 162, 173 ; 28 (1884), pp.94-97; 38 
(1888/89) , pp.106-109; KereskedelmUgyi Magyar Kir. Miruszter , " G~p-gymas 1898", pp.93-96; 
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The Economic Backwardness of Spain in the Nineteenth Century: An Approach 
to the Debate l 
CarIes Sudria, Universitat de Barcelona 
Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to present an approach to the debate that is taking place 
in Spain regarding the economic development of the country during the nineteenth 
century. The issue has been approached by a number of scholars from several points 
of view. The frrst articulate explanations of Spanish backwardness were set out twenty 
years ago by lordi Nadal and Gabriel Tortella .2 The debate acquired momentum with 
new proposals and quantitative estimates presented in the 1980s by Albert Carreras 
and Leandro Prados. 3 A surge of research in the 1990s has increased the number of 
I This paper was prepared for a seminar at the Department of Economic History 
of the London School of Economics. I am indebted to Colin Lewis, Dudley Baines, 
lanet Hunter, and all the other participants at the seminar for their helpful comments . 
I am also grateful to Albert Carreras , lames Simpson and Francisco Alcalci for careful 
and detailed suggestions , and to lordi Nadal for allowing me to use the findings of our 
joint research. 
21. Nadal , 'The failure of the industrial revolution in Spain, 1830-1914' , in C. 
Cipolla, ed. , The Fontana Economic History of Europe, N, The emergence of 
industrial societies. (London, 1983), pp. 532-626; idem, Elfracaso de la Revoluci6n 
industrial en Espafia, 1814-1913. (Barcelona, 1975); G. Tortella, 'Spain, 1829-1874' , 
in R. Cameron, ed., Banking and Economic Development: Some Lessons of History . 
(New York, 1972), pp. 91 -121 ; Idem, Banking, railroads, and industry in Spain, 
1829-1874. (New York, 1977). 
3 A. Carreras , 'La producci6n industrial espanola, 1842-1981: construcci6n de un 
indice anual' . Revista de Historia Econ6mica, vol I, n. 2, 1984, pp. 127-157; ldem, 
'Gasto nacional brute y formaci6n de capital en Espafia, 1849-1958: primer ensayo 
de estimaci6n', in P. Martin Aceiia and L. Prados , eds ., La nueva historia economica 
en Espafia . Madrid , 1985) , pp. 17-51. Both reprinted in A. Carreras , lndustrializacion 
espafiola: estudios de historia cuantitativa. (Madrid, 1990). L. Prados, 'El crecirniento 
econ6mico moderno en Espafia, 1830-1973: una comparaci6n internacional '. Papeles 
de Econom[a Espafiola , 20, 1984, pp . 151-154; Idem, De imperio a naci6n. 
Crecimiento y atraso econ6mico en Espafia (1 780-1930) . (Madrid, 1988). 
participants in the debate and the number of questions under consideration. Some of 
these questions have recently been reassessed by Nadal and Sudria4 
This paper is divided into five principal sections. First, a short quantitative 
reassessment of the background to this issue is presented. Secondly, there is a 
discussion of the causes of economic stagnation in Spain before 1840. Thirdly, some 
recent macroeconomic explanations for the evolution of the Spanish economy in the 
second half of the century will be presented. The last two sections analyse these 
explanations and also present some alternative arguments. 
A quantitative assessment: weak numbers, strong facts 
In the last ten years a considerable effort has been made by Spanish economic 
historians to build up estimates of major macroeconomic variables. The main 
contributors to work on the nineteenth century have been Albert Carreras and Leandro 
Prados. In a seminal work of 1984, Carreras used all available statistical information 
to construct an annual index of industrial production from 1831 onwards. Later, he 
broadened his work to obtain an estimate of GDP.5 Prados first presented some 
benchmark estimates using a distinct set of data .6 Recently, he has built up a new 
annual series for GDP from 1850 onwards, using mostly the data compiled by 
Carreras but applying a different weighting system. 7 These alternative estimates show 
big differences (see Table I) . The main cause of the differences is the lack of reliable 
41. Nadal and C. Sudria, 'La controversia en torno al atraso econ6mico espanol 
en la segunda mitad del siglo XIX (1860-1913),. Revista de Historia Industrial , 3, 
1993, pp. 199-227. 
5 A. Carreras, 'La producci6n industrial '; idem, 'Gasto nacional bruto'. 
6 L. Prados, De Imperio a naci6n . 
7 L. Prados, Spain 's Gross Domestic Product, 1850-1990: a new series. Working 
Paper D-93002. Ministerio de Economia y Hacienda. Direcci6n General de 
Planificaci6n (Madrid, 1993). 
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data. The estimates are derived from a small number of production series. This 
weakness makes any comparison between Spain' s macroeconomic variables and those 
of other countries difficult. Two recent papers that have tried to make such 
comparisons have obtained very different results .8 
Table 1 
Alternative estimates of Sllanish economic llerformance 
(annual growth rates) 
Gross Domestic Product per head 
Carreras Prados Prados 
1988 1993 
1800-1830 n.a -0.06 n.a 
1830-1860 n.a 0.34 n.a 
1860-1890 0.71 1.48 0 .86 
1890-1910 1.52 0.68 0 .68 
Lndustrial production 
1800-1830 n.a -0.33 n.a 
1830-1860 4.67 2.68 n.a 
1860-1890 2.34 2.67 2.31 
1890-1910 2 .01 1.54 1.39 
Sources: A. Carreras, 'Gasto nacional bruto' ; Idem, 'La producci6n industrial 
espano1a' . Prados , De Imperio a nacion; Idem, Spain's Gross Domestic 
Product' . 
Ln spite of these problems, some stylized facts can be derived from both the 
quantitative assessments and the qualitative approaches : 
8 L. Prados, T .Daban, and J . Sanz, De Fabula Narratur? Growth, Structural 
Change and Convergence in Europe, 19th-20th Centuries . Working Paper D-93009. 
Ministerio de Economia y Hacienda. Direcci6n General de P1anificaci6n. (Madrid, 
1993); G. Tortella, 'Patterns of economic retardation and recovery in south-western 
Europe in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries'. Economic History Review , XLVII, 






about 1850, Spain had a G DP per head well below that of the United Kingdom, 
ther countries which were among the first to France, Belgium, and 0 
industrialise; 
the evolution of GDP per h ead from 1850 to 1913 shows, at least four different 
phases (see Figure 1) : 
(the annual growth rates d erived from each estimate cited above); 
Carreras: 1. 91 ; Prados: I. 21) 1850-1866: rapid growth ( 
1866-1870: deep recession (c.: -5.46;P.: -0.72) 
1870-1883: rapid growth ( C.: 4.01; P. : 2 .76) 
1883-1913: slower growth (C.: 0.07; P.: 0.42) 
Figure 1 
Spain's real GDP per he od. Alternative estimates. 1850-1913 ( 1980 pts) 
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So ..... ee: Correros , 'Gosto nocionol bruto'; Prodos, Spain's Gross Domestic Product 
these phases coincide wi 
respect to other countries. 
th the phases of convergence and divergence with 
After 1883, Spain seems to follow the slow-growing 
4 
path of Great Britain instead of the faster path of Italy, Germany or France. It 
is hardly surprising that this period should have been the centre of the debate. 
4) Around 1913, in spite of growth the experienced during the previous fifty 
years , Spanish GDP per capita was below the relative level of 1850 with 
respect to most Western European countries. According to Prados and 
associates, and Tortella, only Italy and, perhaps, Great Britain lost ground 
compared to Spain 
Those conclusions are accepted by most historians of the nineteenth century Spanish 
economy. In fact, the terms ' failure' or 'backwardness' were still used by the early 
analysts of the issue. The quantitative approaches had reasserted a previously held 
general conviction. 
The first stage of modern Spanish backwardness: the loss of empire 
There is general agreement among historians that the Spanish economy suffered a 
serious setback during the period that began in the last decade of the eighteenth 
century and continued until 1840. Some political events were decisive, for example, 
wars against France (1793-1795), Britain (1796-1802 and 1804-1808), and France 
again (1808-1814); the loss of most of the American colonies between 1804 and 1824; 
and a destructive civil war from 1833 to 1840. The consequences of wars were a fall 
in population, devastated land, and a large increase in public debt. 
The loss of empire had more complex economic effects and has been the subject of 
a separate interesting debate . Some historians had argued that the loss of protected 
colonial markets and the disappearance of private and public transfers of money from 
the colonies caused a very serious recession in the Spanish economy. A crisis that 
might be seen as the origin of modem Spanish economic backwardness 9 Leandro 
9 J . Vicens , Manual de historia econ6mica de Espafia. (Barcelona, 1959), p. 555; 
A. Milward and S.B. Saul , The Development of the Economies of Continental Europe, 
1850-1914. (London, 1977), pp. 220-221; S. Pollard, Peaceful Conquest. The 
5 
Prados tried to test this hypothesis by building up an estimate of the impact of the loss 
of the colonies. His conclusion was that this loss can only account for a maximum of 
5.6 per cent decline of GDP.1O 
Arguably , this figure underestimates the economic effects of colonial failure . Prados 
only took into account the loss of colonial markets and the interruption of public 
transfers . He did not account, however, for the monetary effects of loosing the 
colonies. Between 1792 and 1804 Spain received from her colonies one-way transfers 
amounting to 360 million reales annually . In addition, the balance of trade showed a 
surplus of 5 million reales .1I That means an annual net inflow of coined silver of 
365 million from the American colonies. 12 Spain was probably the largest recipient 
of precious metals in Europe. As a consequence, prices were higher in Spain than in 
other European countries . Only when this difference accounted for transport costs did 
European merchandise flow to Spain and silver coins flow to Europe. When these 
transfers ceased, the Spanish economy had to adjust. The huge trade deficit with 
European countries continued until the loss of hard currency forced a deeper fall in 
prices in Spain than in other countries . Deflation carried with it higher real interest 
rates and a fall in business expectations. It is not yet possible to build up an estimate 
of the costs of deflation, but they may be higher than the direct costs calculated by 
Prados. The cost of the deflation may be suggested by a fall in investment between 
industrialization of Europe, 1760-1970. (Oxford,1982) , p. 244. 
10 Prados, De Imperio a nacion, ch. 2 . 
11 Figures from J .P. Merino, J . Cuenca and L. Prados . See P. Pascual and C. 
Sudria, 'Quiebra colonial y ajuste monetario en Espafia'. Estudis d 'Historia Economica 
(Palma de Mallorca), n. 2, 1992, p. 128. 
12 As a point of comparison, it has been estimated that all hard currency in 
circulation in Spain in 1814 was around 3,500 million reales . 
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1820 and 1830 .13 These were decisive years for the introduction of new industrial 
revolution technologies : a decade of depression due to the loss of empire and the 
effects of wars delayed the beginning of industrialization in Spain. 14 
The backwardness in the second half of the nineteenth century: some alternative 
explanations 
As indicated above, the first articulate explanation of the reasons for Spanish economic 
backwardness was presented by J ordi N adal in 1973 in his contribution to the Fontana 
Economic History of Europe . 15 He developed these ideas in his book El fracaso de 
la Revoluci6n industrial en Espana. Essentially, Nadal offers a study of the evolution 
of the industrial sector during the nineteenth century, but his work also included a 
hypothesis about the causes of the ' failure' of the industrial revolution in Spain. His 
main proposal was that the determining factor in this failure was the weakness of 
domestic demand, a weakness caused in turn by the poor performance of Spanish 
agriculture . Very low productivity and unequal income distribution in the primary 
sector kept most of the Spanish population near to subsistence level, with a very low 
purchasing power for manufactured goods . A modern industrial sector developed after 
1840 mainly by substituting domestic craft products and imports . In the 1880s, when 
the domestic market was full y conquered and an agricultural crisis lowered peasants 
income, the expansion of industrial production slowed down. The slack domestic 
demand also explains why Spanish industry concentrated on consumer goods, and, in 
particular, textiles. 
The State contributed to this backwardness by building up an unfair and inefficient 
fiscal system that worsened the unequal distribution of income and caused a chronic 
13 C. Sudria; P. Pascual; Ll. Castafieda, ' Oferta monetaria y fmanciaci6n industrial 
en Catalufia' . Revista de Historia Industrial , n. I , 1992, pp . 189-201. 
14 Pascual and Sudria, 'Quiebra colonial '. 
15 Nadal , 'The failure of the industrial revolution'. 
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public deficit. To fmance this deficit the State got into debt with nationals and 
foreigners. This produced a crowding out effect in the domestic fmancial market and 
by shut down most international markets to Spanish securities after 185l. 
The Nadal thesis was not inconsistent with the argument set out, almost 
simultaneously, by Gabriel Tortella about the building of the railway network and its 
fmancing .16 According to Tortella, a set of specific laws biased the rules of the 
fmancial market in favour of railways . The fmancial effort devoted to them and to the 
State made industrial fmancing more difficult. Using Hirschman's terminology, 
Tortella argued that the Spanish authorities chose a policy of 'development via excess 
capacity of social overhead capital ' rather than supporting 'direct productive 
activities' . Hopes that the manufacturing sector would be stimulated by the availability 
of transportation services proved to be groundless . Traffic barely covered operating 
costs and railway companies were unable to pay interest and dividends . The financial 
system built up around railways collapsed in 1866. Obviously, the railway network 
was useful to manufacturers, but it did not remove the other obstacles that lay in the 
way of industrialization. 
The weak-demand view of Spanish economic backwardness received some criticism 
in the following years ,17 but a global alternative explanation was not provided until 
1988, when Leandro Prados published his book 'De Imperio a naci6n '. Prados built 
up estimates of most macroeconomic indicators and proposed a new interpretation of 
Spanish backwardness in the nineteenth century. Prados 's reasoning began with a new 
estimate of agricultural production. According to this estimate, agricultural 
productivity would have grown at a very impressive rate between 1857 and 1910, 
faster than in Britain or France. If sustained, these estimates would make the 
16 Tortella, 'Spain, 1829-1874'; idem, Banking, railroads, and industry. 
17 See the special issue of Informaci6n Comercial Espaflola devoted to Nadal work 
(n.623, 1985). 
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hypothesis of a stagnant market for manufactured goods untenable. Furthermore, 
Prados's estimate of industrial production showed far more modest growth than 
Carreras' prior calculation. An international comparison also showed that exports 
accounted for a smaller proportion of industrial production in Spain than in other 
European countries. Accordingly, Prados concluded that the causes of slow 
industrialization were to be found mainly in the industrial sector itself -the supply side-
and not in the demand side. 
The most convincing section of Prados 's work was that devoted to the study of 
external trade. He built up seemingly accurate estimates of exports , imports and the 
terms of trade. He defended the view of a positive contribution of external trade to 
Spanish economic development against the sceptical opinion of 10rdi Nadal. The 
coincidence of the more protectionist phase of Spanish commercial policy with the 
slowing down of economic growth permitted Prados to set out a cause-and-effect 
relationship between the two variables. The closure of the Spanish economy brought 
about by the return to high tariff barriers in 1891 after a moderately free-trading 
period produced a deceleration in growth. The structure of Spanish external trade at 
the end of nineteenth century was typical of a backward country . Around 1890, 
Spain's major exports were agricultural products (53%) and minerals (21 %). Major 
imports were manufactured goods (51 %) and raw materials (29 %). Agricultural 
exports were mostly produced in the maritime regions . Industrial production was also 
concentrated in some of these regions . 
The Prados hypothesis was reinforced by a set of proposals presented by Pedro FraiJe 
in a book about the political economy of protectionism in Spain. 18 According to 
Fraile, Spanish industrialists present a perfect example of rent-seekers . Thus, to take 
advantage of a quasi monopolistic situation they would have invested in seeking 
18 P. Fraile, lndustrializacion y grupos de presion. La econom{a polftica de la 
proteccion en Espafla 1900-1950. (Madrid, 1991) . 
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protection from the State instead of spending resources on technical innovation. They 
voluntarily would have given up exports in order to profit from higher domestic 
prices. Spanish industrialists would have forced the country to follow a highly original 
strategy: 'export-substituting deindustrialization' . 
The explanation of Spanish economic backwardness during the nineteenth century 
presented by Prados and Fraile shows very serious shortcomings. These will be 
analysed in the following section of this paper. 
The evidence revisited: a restatement of the causes of Spanish economic 
retardation 
Any consideration of the evolution of the Spanish economy during the nineteenth 
century has to begin with agriculture. The optimistic view held by Leandro Prados 
about the perfonnance of Spanish agriculture has come in for heavy criticism. The 
statistical infonnation that he used to estimate agricultural production has been 
considered unreliable by a number of scholars . 19 Figures for productivity growth 
derived from his estimates seem very unlikely . In an article with Patrick O'Brien, 
Prados himself has included a new calculation of Spanish agricultural productivity in 
1910 that shows a very low level (a third of that of the U.K.) .20 An increase similar 
to that which he defends in his book surely suggests unacceptable levels of 
productivity for 1857 or even 1800. In his more recent calculation of GDP he includes 
a more moderate estimate of the growth of agricultural production?1 The rate of 
growth of output per male worker derived from this new estimate is half that which 
19 See, for instance, J . Simpson, 'La produccion agraria y el consumo espanol en 
el siglo XIX '. Revista de Historia Econ6mica, vol VII , 1989, n.2, pp . 355-388. 
20 P. O' Brien and L. Prados , ' Agricultural productivity and European 
Industrialization, 1890-1980' . Economic History Review, XLV, 1992, n.3 , pp. 514-
536. 
21 Prados, Spain's Gross Domestic Product. 
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he presented in 1988. Despite this, it is still considered too high by some agricultural 
historians . 
Figure 2 
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Source: Nodal and $udrio. 'La controversio en !orno cl olroso' 
In either case, it has to be accepted that there was no substantial increase in the 
average income of the agrarian population measured in agricultural products before 
1914. It must be remembered that agriculture accounted for approximately two-thirds 
of the Spanish labour force throughout the nineteenth century. 22 Contrary to what 
Prados believes, the fact that most of the Spanish population could not increase their 
income is not inconsistent with some rise in the demand for manufactured goods. 23 
The reason for that is quite simple: prices of these goods decreased in real terms as 
a consequence of mechanization. Between 1850 and 1900 the price of cotton goods 
22 Tortella, ' Patterns of economic retardartion', p. 5. 
23 Nadal and Sudria, 'La controversia en torno al atraso' , p. 204. 
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diminished by 55 per cent, roughly the same percentage as in Great Britain (see Figure 
2) . If this were the case for all manufactured consumer goods , the demand for them 
could have doubled in the same period.24 The industrial sector increased its own 
demand through technical innovation. The stagnation of agricultural productivity set 
a slow pace of industrialization but did not prevent it. 
Spanish industry conquered the domestic market thanks to protection. Most 
manufactured goods could not compete in foreign markets . There was not, in any 
case, a voluntary retreat from exports. 25 Instead, there were several reasons that can 
explain the difficulties Spanish industry had in competing. First the problem of coal : 
coal was not in short supply in Spain, but it was very costly to mine . The coalfields 
were located in mountainous regions . The seams were thin and tortuous , and transport 
was very difficult. Despite protection, most of the coal consumed during the 
nineteenth century was imported from Britain. It arrived at Spanish seaports at a price 
that was double or triple the British export price .26 This situation stimulated some 
industrialists to use direct drive hydraulic energy. Obviously, this option was only 
possible for the production of particular goods (textiles, paper, etc.) . It was cheaper 
than steam power, but not cheap enough to bring energy costs down to a level similar 
24 Prices of wheat and other food products were approximately the same in 1850 
and 1900. I assume that consumers only demanded consumer goods and elasticities 
were equal to one. 
25 Most of Fraile' s proposals have been conclusively refuted by Nadal and Sudria 
('La controversia en tomo al atraso') . In the textile industry there was neither a 
situation of monopoly nor oligopoly that made price control possible; nor was there 
ever a real possibility of competing beyond the colonies . In the iron and steel industry 
the loss of foreign markets was a consequence of the disappearance of the comparative 
advantage of Basque iron ore due to the introduction of the new basic methods. 
26 S. Coli , ' Primera parte, 1770-1935 ' in S. Coli and C. Sudriii , El carbOn en 
Espana, 1770-1961. Una historia econ6mica. (Madrid , 1987) ; c. Sudriii, 'Un factor 
determinante: la energia' in J. Nadal, A. Carreras, C. Sudriii, eds ., La economia 
espafiola en el siglo XX. Una perspectiva hist6rica. (Barcelona , 1987) , pp. 313-363 . 
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to those in England or France.27 Secondly, the characteristics of the Spanish 
domestic market: customers dependence on agricultural productivity brought extreme 
instability in the demand for manufactured goods . Any climatic variation led to a 
fluctuation in harvests and each of these fluctuations affected peasants ' income and 
consequently the demand for manufactured goods . To fight against instability, 
industrialists adopted a series of strategies . The structure of production became 
pyramidal . The larger companies had a number of smaller dependent enterprises and 
domestic producers that worked for them. This structure allowed larger enterprises to 
adapt to fluctuations in demand , but also led to less efficiency in the industrial sector 
as a whole. Furthermore , each company tried to produce a wide range of products to 
diminish the risk of a fall in sales of one particular item. Excessive diversification 
increased production costs and prevented the adoption of technologies that required 
mass production.28 
Demand instability had fmancial consequences for industrial companies. Department 
stores and dealers refused to accept bills of exchange to pay for their purchases. They 
did not want to run the risk of changes in demand and preferred to pay when products 
were sold . As a consequence, industrialists had to fmance sales with their own capital, 
and without the help of commercial banks. As sales were usually seasonal , 
industrialists often had a lot of cash in hand without being able to put it to good 
use.29 For the same reason, the development of discount banks came late and was 
weak, even in the more industrialized regions . 
27 A. Carreras, 'El aprovechamiento de la energfa hidniulica en Cataluiia, 1840-
1920. Un ensayo de interpretaci6n '. Revisla de HisLOria Economica, vo!. J, 1983 , n. 
2, pp. 31 -63 . 
28 Nadal and Sudria, ' La controversia en tomo al atraso ', pp. 218-220. 
29 Nadal and Sudria, 'La controversia en tomo al atraso', p. 220 . 
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Poor resource endowment and a weak and unstable domestic market had a negative 
effect on industrial productivity. Furthermore, it should be remembered that after 1891 
corn and coal were heavily protected, and as a consequence, costs of manufacturing 
increased compared to other countries . Yet all of these circumstances do not account 
entirely for the inability of Spanish industry to compete abroad . Control of colonial 
markets in Cuba, Puerto Rico and The Philippines until 1898 also had some bearing 
on the situation. In the 1880's, when the domestic market began to show growing 
demand inelasticity for manufactured goods, Spanish entrepreneurs pressed the 
Government to force the colonies to consume goods from the mother country . In the 
case of cotton goods , exports to the colonies grew from 2 % to 17 % of overall 
production between 1880 and 1897. The availability of this reserve market 
discouraged Spanish industry from competing in more open international markets . 
During those years, other countries like Italy or Germany, began to build commercial 
networks to sell their manufactured goods in fast growing economies like the 
Argentine Republic. When Spanish industrialists tried to do the same after the loss of 
the colonies (1898) , they had to face a number of well-established competitors . 
Without a substantial competitive advantage this proved to be almost impossible. 
A further argument in the debate, the effects of trade policy , also needs to be 
reassessed . The first question is whether a policy devoted to supporting the industrial 
sector was justified. Specific reasons account for official support for manufacturing . 
There was a big productivity gap between agriculture and industry , and this difference 
was far greater than in other countries .30 Probably, the gap between industrial wages 
and agricultural wages was also greater. This meant that the labour market was not 
working well. Redundant agricultural workers did not migrate to urban areas or 
overseas to the same degree in Spain as in other countries in similar circumstances.3 1 
30 Accordingly to Prados estimates . See Nadal and Sudria, 'La controversia en 
lorno al atraso' , p . 223. 
31 D . Baines, Emigrationfrom Europe, 1815-1930. (Basingstoke, 1991), p. 10. 
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The reasons for this might have been illiteracy or the poverty of the peasants 
themselves. Whatever the causes, the consequences were higher industrial wages and 
lower industrial production. Intervention designed to offset this distortion would have 
increased GDP and economic growth. Another reason for intervention can be found 
in the availability of industrial skills. Spain was a country that adopted innovations 
from abroad . The implementation of foreign technical innovation and the formation 
of human capital were of prime importance for her industrialization. Both would 
generate externalities . Each technical innovation had to be imported and adapted. 
Innovative enterprises that accomplished this goal favoured the spread of innovations 
in the industrial sector, thereby making it easier for other enterprises to adopt 
innovations at lower cost. Furthermore, enterprises that trained their workers in 
technical skills helped to encourage the adoption of more productive techniques not 
only in the same sector but also in others. Intervention aimed at compensating 
innovative enterprises for those externalities would also have increased GDP and 
economic growth 32 
Given these circumstances, the best policy would have been to set up a system of 
direct subsidies to innovative companies . But would that have been possible in 
nineteenth century Spain? As has been noted above, the Spanish government was 
incapable of meeting even its normal expenses . To introduce tariffs to protect more 
innovative industrial production was economically less efficient (a ' second best 
policy') but was probably the only form of intervention available to correct distortions . 
The question that new researchers will have to answer is whether the costs of 
industria] protection were greater or less than the profits obtained from it. Obviously, 
the results of such an inquiry will be different for each industrial product and it is not 
easy to predict them in advance. Possibly , protection would have been more costly 
in the production of goods controlled by a small number of companies that were able 
to influence output and prices. But, in the other hand, protection could have provided 
32 Nadal and Sudria, 'La controversia en torno al atraso' , p. 223-224. 
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greater positive external effects in those sectors of production where companies were 
able to import technical innovations and to train a large number of unskilled workers . 
These considerations do not apply to tariffs imposed on agricultural products and raw 
materials . No externalities of any type can be found in their production, and 
conversely protection would have harmed all other sectors of the economy. In the case 
of wheat, some calculations are available. Between 1880 and 1900, the price of wheat 
diminished by 40 % in Great Britain, 35 % in France, 30 % in Germany, 20 % in 
Italy, and only by 8-10 % in Spain. It has been estimated that if the fall of the price 
of wheat would had been similar in Spain to that in Italy, domestic demand for textiles 
would have been 50 % larger than it actually was .33 
In my opinion, a more moderate view of the consequences of Spanish trade policy 
emerges from these considerations. Industrial protection - despite having been 
excessive and not sufficiently discriminatory - could have had a positive effect on 
economic growth, whereas tariffs on other goods would have been very harmful. In 
any case, industrial protectionism would not provide an explanation for differences in 
the growth rate between Spain and other countries during the three decades preceding 
the First World War. It is well known that changes in commercial policies were 
adopted by most European countries . Only in the case of agricultural products could 
the greater level of protection with respect to other countries partly explain differences 
in growth rates. 
Evidence seems to suggest that in some ways the industrial sector recovered from its 
retardation during the last half of the nineteenth century. Around the middle of the 
century, technical innovations reached Spain with a delay of 30 or 40 years . At the 
33 J. Palafox, Atraso econ6mico y democracia . (Barcelona , 199\), ch. I , and note 
H. 
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beginning of the twentieth century , retardation was minimal .34 This points to the 
beneficial effects of the protection of industrial activities . At the beginning of the 
twentietb century, the main problem was no longer the technical backwardness of 
industry but the slow rate of industrial growtb and the difficulties that Spanish 
industrial goods had in competing abroad . 
One of most outstanding consequences of the budget deficit run by the State during 
tbe second half of tbe nineteentb century was monetary instability. In 1883, the 
convertibility of the peseta was suspended . Difficulties in preventing the outflow of 
gold, the budget deficit, and tbe reluctance to reduce the stock of paper currency have 
been suggested as reasons for this decision. A fiduciary system lasted until 1914 and 
beyond. The peseta depreciated until 1898 as a consequence of the growing budget 
deficit and recovered slightly later. 35 There is some disagreement as to the 
consequences of this situation. It seems tbat monetary depreciation was offset by tbe 
increase in prices and tberefore did not imply an additional form of protection and nor 
did it make exports more competitive. 36 The effect on capital imports could have 
been more important. After 1880, inflows of foreign capital were scarce. It can be 
argued that a slow growing Spanish economy had little appeal for foreign investors but 
it is also true that some new activities - like hydroelectricity or fertilizer production -
were developed mostly by national entrepreneurs unlike in Italy and other countries . 
34 Coal gas, the mechanical loom and tbe use of coke in tbe iron industry are good 
examples of innovations which reached Spain with substantial delay , in the middle of 
tbe nineteenth century; electricity, the electric engine, the motor car and some 
chemical products are examples of the recovery at the beginning of the twentieth 
century . See 1. Nadal, 'Espafia durante la la Revoluci6n TecnoI6gica' , and A. 
Carreras , ' Espafia durante la 2a Revoluci6n TecnoI6gica ', both in Ministerio de 
Industria y Energia, Espafla: 200 aflos de tecnologia. (Madrid, 1988). 
35 P. Martin-Acena , 'Spain during the classical gold standard years, 1880-1914' , 
in M.D. Bordo and F. Capie, Monetary regimes in transition . (Cambridge, 1993), pp. 
135-172. 
36 M. Sabate, 'Tipo de cambio y protecci6n en la economia espafiola de principios 
de siglo'. Revista de Economia Aplicada , vol I , 1993 , n. I , pp . 67-86. 
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Uncertainty about the exchange rate of the peseta could have been a cause of restraint 
on foreign investment. As a consequence of the lack of capital inflows and the 
budget deficit, monetary flexibility did not allow for lower interest rates . Between 
1880 and 1914, Spanish interest rates were the highest in Western Europe. 37 
Conclusion 
Any assessment of Spanish economic backwardness has to take account of the serious 
setback that the country suffered for almost fifty years, from 1793 to 1840. Wars 
against Great Britain and France, the loss of most of the empire and civil war isolated 
Spain from Europe and in themselves imposed a heavy economic burden. As 
indicated above, recent calculations have underestimated the cost of the loss of the 
colonies. The adjustment to the new situation implied an intense deflation that delayed 
the economic recovery at least a decade between 1820 and 1830. Until 1840 Spain was 
not in situation to begin a nonnal process of development. This development, 
however, was not strong enough to reduce the economic gap which had opened up 
during the previous period. 
The main cause of the slowness of Spanish development in the second half of the 
nineteenth century was poor agricultural productivity . This view is supported by 
Gabriel Tortella's recent paper. 38 The most important reason for the poor 
productivity of Spanish agriculture was the physical environment: scarce rainfall , 
altitude and rocky and thin soils. As Tortella pointed out, citing Pounds , agricultural 
conditions were poorer in Spain than in other Mediterranean countries like ltaly. 39 
37 X. Tafunell , ' Asociaci6n mercatil y Bolsa' in A. Carreras , ed ., Estadisticas 
Hist6ricas de Espana. Siglos XIX y XX. (Madrid, 1989) , p. 473 ; P. Martin-Acena, 
'Spain during the classical gold standard years' . 
38 Tortella, 'Patterns of economic retardation'. 
39 Tortella, 'Patterns of economic retardation', p. 8; N. Pounds, An historical and 
political geography of Europe. (1947) , p. 217-219. 
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Poor productivity in agriculture produced a weak and unstable market for 
manufactured goods . To adapt to this situation most industrial enterprises adopted 
strategies of diversification that damaged their own productivity and thus prevented 
them from competing abroad. Market instability also had pervasive effects on the 
fmancial costs for producers of manufactured goods. 
Tortella has also pointed out social stratification and illiteracy as causes of retardation. 
The effects of social stratification were a very unequal distribution of income and a 
concentration of profits in the hands of a stratum of aristocratic landowners unwilling 
to invest in innovative sectors. Illiteracy was a consequence of the low income level 
of most peasants and, this in turn, prevented them from learning new techniques and 
hindered migration. Such situations were more common in areas of lower productivity 
and worse physical conditions , so we can consider these obstacles to development as 
social aspects of agricultural conditions . 
Trade policy has often been cited as one of the major reasons for Spanish 
backwardness. The importance of this factor has been grossly exaggerated. Some 
trade protection to industry was justifiable as a second best policy designed to 
encourage innovative activities. Tariffs applied to agricultural products and raw 
materials were unjustifiable, but were only relevant from 1890 onwards. Other 
policies adopted by the authorities in the second half of the nineteenth century 
probably had worse consequences. Preferential fmance conditions granted to railways , 
budget deficits and monetary disturbances affected interest rates and obstructed the 
flow of capital to more innovative sectors. 
As mentioned at the beginning of the paper, the relative degree of Spanish retardation 
increased during the three decades preceding World War I. This has to be seen in 
terms of both the structural problems of Spanish economy, outlined immediately 
above, and changes in the international economic environment during these years. The 
most critical factors determining the slowdown are as follows: 
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a) the exhaustion of the domestic market for manufactured goods after some 
decades of expansion (an expansion based on the substitution of imports and 
craft goods) ; 
b) the loss of the last few colonies and the inability of Spanish industry to compete 
in open international markets; 
c) the cost of colonial wars and the fiscal policy of the Government that caused 
the budget deficit and the national debt to grow and produced an increase in 
interest rates ; 
d) the inconvertibility of Spanish paper money after 1883 that created uncertainty 
about the exchange rate which in turn could have depressed imports of capital 
Most Spanish economic historians agree that there are no simple explanations for the 
economic backwardness of the country. The task of historians should be to assess 
each factor and attach to it the weight that it deserves . 
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